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UID:614a45d68c5f3988901710e3a2c8ec1f
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20150211T193727
SUMMARY:Nemanja Antic - Princeton University (Job Market Seminar)
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Contracting With Unknown Technologies\nAbstract:\nI study contracting with 
 moral hazard when the agent has available a known (baseline) production tec
 hnology but the principal thinks that the agent may also have access to oth
 er technologies, and maximizes his worst-case expected utilities under thos
 e possible technologies. All Pareto-efficient contracts take the form of pa
 rticipating preferred equity, a mixture of debt and equity. The nature of t
 he contract depends on the most unproductive (in terms of stochastic domina
 nce) technology that the principal thinks might be available to the agent. 
 As this lower-bound technology becomes worse, the efficient contracts appro
 ach equity, generalizing existing work on robust contracting. When the lowe
 r-bound technology approaches the baseline technology, efficient contracts 
 approach debt, providing more robust foundations for the classic financial 
 contracting model.\n \n \n
DTSTAMP:20260404T104451Z
DTSTART:20150130T153000Z
DTEND:20150130T170000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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