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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:614a45d68c5f3988901710e3a2c8ec1f
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20150211T193727
SUMMARY:Nemanja Antic - Princeton University (Job Market Seminar)
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Contracting With Unknown Technologi
 es</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Abstract:</p><p style="text-
 align: justify;">I study contracting with moral hazard when the agent has a
 vailable a known (baseline) production technology but the principal thinks 
 that the agent may also have access to other technologies, and maximizes hi
 s worst-case expected utilities under those possible technologies. All Pare
 to-efficient contracts take the form of participating preferred equity, a m
 ixture of debt and equity. The nature of the contract depends on the most u
 nproductive (in terms of stochastic dominance) technology that the principa
 l thinks might be available to the agent. As this lower-bound technology be
 comes worse, the efficient contracts approach equity, generalizing existing
  work on robust contracting. When the lower-bound technology approaches the
  baseline technology, efficient contracts approach debt, providing more rob
 ust foundations for the classic financial contracting model.</p><p style="t
 ext-align: justify;"> </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> </p>
DTSTAMP:20260404T104625Z
DTSTART:20150130T153000Z
DTEND:20150130T170000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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