The Coevolution of Patience and Collaboration< /p>
Abstract:
We study the determinant s of economic collaboration in an evolutionary model of inherited time pref erences. The population consists of patient and impatient agents, with evol utionary fitness depending on income. Individuals choose between home produ ction and going to the market, where they are randomly matched in pairs for collaboration in production. Collaboration has the potential for ongoing h igher productivity but is vulnerable to defection. In equilibrium, at least some of the impatient agents go to the collaboration market but they alway s defect. Patient agents always go to the market and cooperate, even if the ir fraction of the population is arbitrarily small. In the nontrivial evolu tionary steady state, a higher return to collaboration could increase or de crease collaboration in the economy. The provision of law and order, by pun ishing defectors, unambiguously increases collaboration. Thus, the model ge nerates empirical predictions linking state history to current trust, colla boration, and wealth.
DTSTAMP:20260409T034802Z DTSTART:20240229T143000Z DTEND:20240229T160000Z SEQUENCE:0 TRANSP:OPAQUE END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR