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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:b2e5f545cc3219be7111d3f8adb3e1d2
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20250709T131145
SUMMARY:Andrea Chiavari - University of Oxford
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nMirrleesian Carbon Taxation\n\n\nAbstract: \nAlleviating the econo
 mic damages from climate change is, to first order, a problem of efficientl
 y limiting firms' emissions. We analyze a neoclassical general-equilibrium 
 model in which fossil-energy use generates climate damages. The model cruci
 ally incorporates substantial cross-firm heterogeneity in emission efficien
 cy that we document using a novel firm-level dataset spanning 150 countries
 . Firms choose energy and other inputs and self-report emissions that are o
 therwise privately observed. Our central result is a simple formula for the
  marginal externality damage of emissions---the optimal carbon tax---that a
 ccounts for firms' incentives to distort reported emissions. The optimal ta
 x varies markedly across firms as a function of marginal damages, output an
 d emission efficiencies, and exceeds common uniform-tax benchmarks, on aver
 age. Quantifying the model shows large welfare gains from internalizing rep
 orting incentives: the constrained optimal tax recovers 3/4 of the potentia
 l welfare benefits; a uniform tax that does not internalize reporting incen
 tives, by contrast, recovers almost none of them.\n
DTSTAMP:20260415T001356Z
DTSTART:20251027T163000Z
DTEND:20251027T180000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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