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UID:92678f52e5afd566e31c3c912101c466
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20250703T114241
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Max Miller - Harvard Business School
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nWho wins (and loses) from lobbying? Evidence from the Foreign Agents Re
 gistration Act\n\n\nAbstract: \nThis paper examines the benefits and c
 osts of lobbying among three main groups---lobbyists' clients, legislators,
  and the people legislators represent. We do this by exploiting a unique fe
 ature of foreign lobbying in the United States: Lobbyists must report detai
 led accounts of their political activity on behalf of foreign clients. We c
 ombine the foreign government-lobbyist-legislator linkages these data provi
 de---which are not present in domestic lobbying data---and several sources 
 of exogenous variation in connections of lobbying clients and legislators t
 o causally identify the impact of lobbying. Across multiple outcomes, we fi
 nd that foreign countries and legislators benefit from lobbying. The people
  from more heavily lobbied congressional districts, however, do not, with g
 reater lobbying intensity causally linked to lower district-level employmen
 t and gross domestic product growth. We then provide evidence that the nega
 tive effects for constituents are due to misallocation arising from special
  interest capture. Our results challenge the view that lobbyists mainly pro
 vide technical expertise for better policymaking and highlight that the ben
 efits clients of lobbyists receive may come at the expense of voters.\n
DTSTAMP:20260504T141813Z
DTSTART:20250714T130000Z
DTEND:20250714T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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