BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//jEvents 2.0 for Joomla//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:380dcbf341ca06d6495cba150be619aa
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20260512T051731
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Paolo Martellini - NYU Stern
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nRedistributing Peer Effects (joint with Ezra Oberfield)\n\n\nAbstract:&
 nbsp;\nWe study how a planner should assign agents to clubs---schools, firm
 s, neighborhoods---whose quality depends on the composition of their member
 s, when agents privately invest in becoming qualified. Investments are risk
 y, and both the planner and the agent observe only noisy signals of qualifi
 cation. When forming clubs, the planner balances three objectives: rewardin
 g strong signals to sustain investment, insuring agents against unsuccessfu
 l investments, and redistributing toward those who face higher cost of inve
 stment. The optimal assignment takes a simple shape. Agents with weak signa
 ls are grouped into low quality clubs that pool a wide range of posteriors,
  while those with strong signals are fully separated into homogeneous clubs
  with higher quality. Higher-ability agents receive more dispersed placemen
 ts across clubs and steeper consumption schedules in the signal. A single t
 ype-specific subsidy, linear in the quality of the club one joins, implemen
 ts the optimum---with direct implications for the design of college-aid for
 mulas and related redistributive policies in settings with peer effects. We
  next study an environment with two observably distinct populations, one fo
 r which investment costs tend to be higher. For a given signal, the planner
  assigns peers of higher qualification to members of the disadvantaged popu
 lation.\n
DTSTAMP:20260620T131712Z
DTSTART:20260616T130000Z
DTEND:20260616T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR