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UID:40630d948d8987ee1a9db130cb1c7789
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20260511T072008
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Anatoli Segura - Velez - Bank of Italy
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Banks, venture capitalists and low innovation traps (joint with Javier Suar
 ez, Cemfi)\n\n\nAbstract:\nWe analyze how competition between banks and ven
 ture capitalists affects young firms’ access to credit and their incentives
  to innovate. Banks’ long-term funding arrangements provide lending insuran
 ce to firms, facilitating the scale-up of moderate-potential firms with lim
 ited pledgeable income. Venture capitalists can early identify high-potenti
 al firms, cream skimming them from the pool of bank-funded firms while also
  improving the return to entrepreneurial innovation. The competitive equili
 brium is generally constrained inefficient as no financier internalizes the
  effect of its funding on the balance between the benefits from funding ins
 urance and its impact on the incentives to innovate. Strategic complementar
 ities due to the presence of lending insurance can cause multiplicity of eq
 uilibria. When venture capitalists ability to identify innovative projects 
 is limited, subsidizing their funding to firms with taxes on banks leads to
  constrained efficient outcomes and can eliminate self-fulfilling equilibri
 a with low innovation. The analysis has implications for economies such as 
 the European Union that lag behind the US in terms of both innovation and f
 unding opportunities for rising stars.\n
DTSTAMP:20260703T033942Z
DTSTART:20260708T130000Z
DTEND:20260708T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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