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UID:e8ee5e937332388128cb925030ba5719
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20150210T182815
SUMMARY:David Laibson - Harvard University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Self Control and Liquidity: How to Design a Commitment Contract\nAbstract:\
 nIf individuals have self - control problems that lead them to spend money 
 that they had previously planned to save, they may take up commitment contr
 acts that restrict their spending . We experimentally investigate how the d
 emand for commitment contracts is affected by contract design. Each experim
 ental subject receives an endowment of money and divides that money between
  a liquid account, which permits unrestricted withdrawals, and a commitment
  account, which imposes a penalty on early withdrawals. The features of the
  liquid account are the same for all subjects, but the features of the comm
 itment account are randomized across subjects. The commitment account that 
 disallows early withdrawals — the most illiquid commitment account — attrac
 ts more money than any other commitment account. We extend the theoretical 
 work of Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (2006) to show that the pattern of e
 xperimental commitment account allocations arises in a leading model of int
 ertemporal choice under natural assumptions.\n
DTSTAMP:20260405T121207Z
DTSTART:20140609T173000Z
DTEND:20140609T190000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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