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UID:e8ee5e937332388128cb925030ba5719
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20150210T182815
SUMMARY:David Laibson - Harvard University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Self Control and Liquidity: How to 
 Design a Commitment Contract</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ab
 stract:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If individuals have self - contr
 ol problems that lead them to spend money that they had previously planned 
 to save, they may take up commitment contracts that restrict their spending
  . We experimentally investigate how the demand for commitment contracts is
  affected by contract design. Each experimental subject receives an endowme
 nt of money and divides that money between a liquid account, which permits 
 unrestricted withdrawals, and a commitment account, which imposes a penalty
  on early withdrawals. The features of the liquid account are the same for 
 all subjects, but the features of the commitment account are randomized acr
 oss subjects. The commitment account that disallows early withdrawals — the
  most illiquid commitment account — attracts more money than any other comm
 itment account. We extend the theoretical work of Amador, Werning, and Ange
 letos (2006) to show that the pattern of experimental commitment account al
 locations arises in a leading model of intertemporal choice under natural a
 ssumptions.</p>
DTSTAMP:20260405T121219Z
DTSTART:20140609T173000Z
DTEND:20140609T190000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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