Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Great War of Afri ca
Abstract:
Many wars involve complicated webs of alliances and rivalries between multiple actors. Examples include the re cent civil wars in Somalia, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. W e study from a theoretical and empirical perspective how the network of mil itary alliances and rivalries affects the overall conflict intensity, destr uction and death toll. The theoretical analysis combines insights from netw ork theory and from the politico-economic theory of conflict. We construct a non-cooperative model of tactical fighting featuring two novel externalit ies: each group’s strength is augmented by the fighting effort of its allie d, and weakened by the fighting effort of its rivals. We achieve a closed f orm characterization of the Nash equilibrium of the fighting game, and of h ow the network structure affects individual and total fighting efforts. We then perform an empirical analysis using data for the Second Congo (DRC) Wa r, a conflict involving many groups and a complex network of alliances and rivalries. We obtain structural estimates of the fighting externalities, an d use them to infer the extent to which the removal of each group involved in the conflict would reduce the conflict intensity.
DTSTAMP:20260405T194600Z DTSTART:20140526T173000Z DTEND:20140526T190000Z SEQUENCE:0 TRANSP:OPAQUE END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR