

# CORPORATE NETWORKS AND PEER EFFECTS IN FIRM POLICIES <sup>\*</sup>

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### ABSTRACT

This paper identifies the effect of corporate networks on firms' financial investment and executive pay decisions. Corporate networks arise through board interlocks, which provide a frequent and important channel for non-market interactions amongst firms. Using panel data for all publicly traded companies in India I estimate peer effects in firm policies, defining each firm's reference group as the set of all other firms with whom it shares one or more directors. Identification of dynamic network peer effects, which derive from endogenous associations, is achieved by exploiting natural breaks in network evolution that exogenously change the composition of peers. These breaks occur as a result of local network shocks – death or retirement of shared directors – that are stochastic and external to the network formation process. I find significant network peer effects that are positively associated with firms' investment strategy and executive compensation. I also explore heterogeneity in peer effects by distinguishing between network peers who belong to the same industry from those that do not, and find a greater effect of across-industry network peers.

**Keywords:** Corporate finance and governance, peer effects, networks

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# 1 INTRODUCTION

The objective of this paper is to estimate the importance of non-market interactions amongst firms on their investment portfolio and executive compensation policy decisions. Non-market interactions arise when firms interact with other firms informally, beyond the ambit of a market determined structure. This can be achieved, for example, by entering into board interlocks or through shared social connections between employees, among other things. A canonical model of firm behavior would suggest that a firm's decision on policies, such as investment or remuneration, are determined by a combination of the firm's own fundamentals and market prices. However, there is substantial evidence to indicate that firm decisions often exhibit strategic complementarities (Glaeser and Scheinkman 2002). This occurs when firms have preferences for conforming with, or are aided by, the decisions of their peers. Instances of such behaviour are quite pervasive; a firm may gain information from another firm about strategic investment opportunities, or may simply mimic the decisions adopted by its peers so as to align itself in accordance with aggregate group choices. In either case, such interactions imply that each firm's decision has spillover effects on the decisions of other firms. The existence of such complementarities, when driven by peer influences that are not mediated through a formal price mechanism, are therefore relevant and contribute fundamentally to our understanding of firm level behavior. While a multitude of models, mainly theoretical, have investigated this phenomenon, there is little empirical evidence to validate such effects. This paper provides evidence to show that firms exist and indeed act in *networks*. By receiving and responding to external network driven impulses, firm actions have the capacity to generate large multiplier effects.

Using firm level panel data for all publicly traded companies in India covering the period 1998-2010, I estimate peer effects in firm investment in marketable securities ('corporate market investments') and executive compensation. Peer effects refer to the broad class of externalities that arise when a firm's own behaviour is responsive to the behaviour as well as the characteristics of other firms in its chosen reference group. I construct peer groups using interactions that occur within and across industry, through corporate networks based on interlocking directorates. Two firms share a network link and are part of each other's peer group if they share one or more directors. The networks spanned by interlocked boards are longitudinal in nature and change over time due to entry and exit of directors. A firm's decision to enter into a board interlock is often strategic with the consequence that corporate networks are endogenously determined<sup>1</sup>.

A central contribution of this paper is the identification and estimation of peers effects in endogenously formed networks. The identification of peer effects encounters well known problems laid out in Manski (1993). Manski lists three effects that need to be distinguished in the analysis of peer effects. The first type are endogenous effects which arise from a firm's propensity to respond to the *outcomes* of its peers. For example, a firm is inclined to invest more if it observes its peers investing heavily. The second are so-called contextual effects which represent the propensity of a firm to

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<sup>1</sup>In Section 2, I review both the causes and consequences of board interlocks.

behave in some way as a function of the exogenous characteristics of its peer group. For instance a firm is able to spend more on investment independently of its own profits if it receives some positive externalities from its peers' profits<sup>2</sup>. The third type are so-called correlated effects which describe circumstances in which firms in the same group tend to behave similarly because they have similar individual characteristics or face similar institutional arrangements, i.e., firms within the same industry may behave similarly due to common industry-specific shocks. This means that there are unobservables in a group which may have a direct effect on observed outcomes. The main empirical challenges, therefore, consist in (1) disentangling *contextual* effects, from *endogenous* effects and (2) distinguishing between *social* effects, i.e., exogenous and endogenous effects, and *correlated* effects. Identification of network-based peer effects is confounded by additional problems of self-selection and endogenous network formation.

I present a novel identification strategy that exploits both the structure and inter-temporal variation of the corporate network to estimate network-based peer effects. To mitigate bias associated with non-random selection, in addition to differencing out firm fixed effects, I use the death or retirement of firm directors as a natural experiment that exogenously break network links and change the composition of peers in the next period. I control for the direct effect of director exits due to death or retirement on the outcome and require only that there be no systematic differences in director exits that break interlocks and those that do not (i.e. director exits of unconnected directors)<sup>3</sup>. Finally, to purge out correlated effects, I control for common time-varying shocks that occur both across industry and business group by employing industry by business group by time fixed effects.

Examining peer influence on firm investment and compensation policies is important for several reasons. Positive and significant network peer effects in firm market investment, wherein a firm's decision to invest is influenced by the aggregate investment behaviour of its peers, have the ability to propagate asset bubbles or contribute to financial clustering. A vast literature examining financial herding and information cascades find evidence on correlated trading, both at the institutional & individual level<sup>4</sup> (Seasholes 2011). The peer interactions framework complements this literature by providing precise mediums through which such correlated trading decisions could be influenced. For example, as discussed below, distinguishing between market-based peer effects (industry peers) from non-market based peer effects (corporate networks, shared educational associations etc.) allows us to determine the appropriate reference group through which these social multiplier effects emanate (if any).

Likewise, firms influencing each other on executive compensation policies have the effect of distorting performance oriented pay-scales. Many CEO's themselves are directors on boards of other firms.

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<sup>2</sup>This is especially the case with firms that have a common ownership structure wherein profits could be tunnelled between firms to fund each other's investment activities (Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan 2002).

<sup>3</sup>The identification assumptions are violated if firms choose to strategically replace the lost directors with directors of equally well connected companies. To ensure that this is not the case, I estimate a simple difference-in-difference regression and find no significant effect of a director death or retirement shock to a firm in the past period on its probability of forming a new link.

<sup>4</sup>See Allen and Babus (2009) for an excellent review of financial networks and its implications; see also Ozsoylev (2003) for a good theoretical understanding on how social networks may lead to clustered financial decision making.

Potentially this could mean either that networked CEO's are more likely to collude and influence each other's pay or at least have access to information on the setting of other CEO's pay scales. The recent phenomena of rising CEO pay have been a topic of widespread debate, both academically and in popular press. The debate is centered on understanding how much of the rise in executive pay is attributable to performance driven improvements relative to firm desired conformity effects. The latter effect, popularly termed the "Lake Wobegone Effect"<sup>5</sup> reflects the fact that no firm wants to admit to having a CEO who is below average, and as a result will choose to pay them in accordance with the compensation levels set by their peers (Hayes and Schaefer 2009). Actions such as these, which are in part influenced by social interactions, could lead to CEO's of firms being paid much above their marginal product only to ensure that a particular standard is met. In this paper I provide a rich framework, that of network-based non-market interactions of firms, with which to understand the observed congruence in firm policies relating to both corporate market investment and executive pay-scales.

Overall, I find evidence for positive network-based peer spillovers. An increase of one standard deviation in network peer investment causes an increase of 0.16 standard deviations in the growth of own firm investment. Similarly an increase of one standard deviation in network peer executive compensation causes an increase of 0.05 standard deviations in the growth of own firm executive compensation. For investment, I also use detailed stock-wise breakdown of investments for each company, and show that for any two companies, the probability of investing in the same stock at any given time is increasing in the strength of their network ties. In order to further understand the mechanisms driving the aggregate peer induced outcome increase, I disaggregate the network into two further groups: network peers who are in the same industry as the firm and network peers who are not<sup>6</sup>. I find that for both market investment and executive compensation, industry network peer effects are close to zero while non-industry network peer effects are positive and significant. Finally, I find positive industry peer effects for market investment and R&D but not for executive compensation.

The paper is most closely related to the small but growing body of literature that provide evidence for corporate peer effects. In recent work, Leary and Roberts (2010) show that corporate financial policies are highly interdependent. Taking the industry as the peer reference group, they identify peer effects by using idiosyncratic shocks of peer firms as instruments and find that a one standard deviation change in industry based peer firms' leverage ratios is associated with an 11% change in

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<sup>5</sup>"Where's the stick?", *The Economist*, October 2003; "Are India CEO's Overpaid", *Business Today*, July 2007; "Do Indian CEO's Overpay Themselves", *Rediff Business*, October 2009.

<sup>6</sup>The reason for separating peer effects using these pre-defined groups is to distinguish between the different types of interactions that a firm can have even within its given network. If information is the channels through which these peers effects dissipate then it is likely that a firm will ignore information received from its competitors and there will be no industry network peer effects. However a finding of positive industry network peer effects indicate that firms could potentially be mimicking the behaviour of its competitors. I also distinguish between industry peer effects i.e. the effect of peers in a firms industry and overall network peer effect (containing both industry and non-industry within network peers). The disaggregation of peer effects into industry peers and non-industry peers is different from above because the former seeks to understand how even within the network firms differentially respond between industry and non-industry peers.

own firm leverage ratios. They argue that these effects are consistent with models of learning and show that smaller, more financially constrained firms exhibit ‘more pronounced mimicking tendencies’. [Fracassi \(2008\)](#) using data on board interlocks<sup>7</sup> in the United States provides further evidence that firms are influenced by their social peers when making corporate policy decisions. He finds that more social connections two companies share with each other, the more similar their level and change of investment behaviour is over time. In the same context, [Bouwman \(2011\)](#) finds that governance practices are propagated across firms through a network of shared directors. She shows that these network effects lead to a convergence in governance practices because of the influence of directors who sit on the boards of different firms. In relation to firm compensation policy, [Shue \(2011\)](#) exploits random assignment of MBA students to sections within classes at Harvard Business School and finds that executive compensation and acquisitions strategy are significantly more similar among graduates from the same section than among graduates from different sections within the same class.

In addition to developing an identification strategy that estimates peer effects accounting for endogenous network selection; the paper contributes to the empirical literature on firm level social interactions by providing evidence for the presence and importance of network-based peer effects in a developing country. The Indian context is different from other developed country settings, such as the United States and United Kingdom which have been the focus of previous literature, because corporate governance rules are less stringent and more informal in India (see [Estrin and Prevezer \(2011\)](#)). From a policy perspective, (only) endogenous peer effects have the capacity to generate multiplier effects so that a finding of positive and significant endogenous effects, that increase the variability of aggregate outcomes relative to variation in firm fundamentals, are suggestive to some degree of market imperfections. The paper’s results therefore have immediate implications for corporate governance related regulatory policy that aim to correct such market imperfections. Corporate governance policies target and regulate both the *scope* and *structure* of interlocks. One obvious possibility, depending on whether peer effects are considered desirable or not, is to place a cap on the number of interlocks that any firm can partake in. Another policy intervention, that is a matter of on-going debate amongst policymakers and corporate boards in India, is whether to restrict the prevalence of intra-industry interlocks with the view to prevent collusive activity from occurring<sup>8</sup>. My results, when viewed in this context, are informative to the extent that I find negligible peer effects from firm interlocks within the same industry.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the construction of industry and network reference groups. Section 3 discusses the identification strategy and the empirical framework. The data used is described in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 provides robustness checks while Section 7 examines alternative reference groups settings. Section 8 concludes.

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<sup>7</sup>Other work relating to corporate networks via board interlocks include [Khwaja, Mian, and Qamar \(2011\)](#) who estimate the value of corporate networks in Pakistan and find that membership in a highly clustered component of a network increases total external financing and better insures firms against industry and location shocks.

<sup>8</sup>For example in the United States, the Clayton Act prohibits interlocking directorates by U.S. companies competing in the same industry.

## 2 FIRM INTERACTIONS THROUGH CORPORATE NETWORKS

Firms can potentially be influenced by two types of peer firms – those that it considers its competitors and those with whom it shares an affiliation of sorts. As stated before, in this paper I consider corporate network & ownership related peer groups. I also provide evidence considering industry based peer groups. Below I provide definitions for each.

**Corporate Network Affiliation:** This type of affiliation comes from firm relationships fostered through interlocked board of directorates. Mizruchi (1996) defines an interlocking to occur “...when a person affiliated with one organization sits on the board of directors of another organization” (pg. 1). This means that two firms share a direct link in the corporate network if they share a shared director. A firm can have one or more directors who sit on the boards of other firms. Indian corporate governance regulations mandate that a director sit on no more than fifteen firms at a time. Corporate networks evolve over time due to link additions and deletions from shared director entry & exits. Interlocked boards provide an important source of information about a firm’s network. Directors who sit across the boards of many firms, hence connecting them, not only have access to a large amount of information on each firms’ policy but also exert a significant influence on the formulation of these policies. As pointed out earlier, many authors find evidence of similarities in corporate behaviour of firms that are linked through this type of a corporate network. I discuss below the relevance of interlocked directorates.

Mizruchi (1996) provides a review of board interlocks where he describes the origins and features of common board interlocks in the United States. He highlights three factors, among other reasons, that help explain the formation of interlocks: collusion, monitoring and social cohesion. The intent to collude between competitors as a means of restricting competition may lead to the formation of interlocks. This is evident for instance through the findings that most interlocks occur within a specific industry (Pennings 1980). The second reason is that interlocking provides for a means to co-opt and monitor sources of environmental uncertainty. Firms tend to employ board seats as devices to monitor other firms and their organizational decision making suggesting that interlocks can act as instruments of corporate control. A wide range of literature has found evidence suggesting that interlocks are positively associated with firm profitability (Baysinger and Butler 1985; Burt 1983). It is unclear however, whether this is due to the fact that firms tend to monitor each other effectively through interlocks or that profitable firms tend to interlock more. Finally, interlocks can occur as a result of social cohesion wherein individuals are invited to sit on boards of firms due to their past associations (social, educational etc.) with other board members.

More importantly, for the purposes of this paper, there are many consequences of such board interlocks. Mainly, it is argued that board interlocks lead to a heightened sense of corporate control whereby firms used the board interlock to extend their control on their partner firms’ policy decisions. Executive compensation is typical example of such a policy decision. Guedj and Barnea (2009) use data on directors who served on the boards of S&P firms and find evidence that firms

whose directors are more central in the network, pay their CEO higher and that CEO pay is less sensitive to firm performance. Another consequence of board interlocks is ‘network embeddedness’ i.e. interlocks connect multiple firms with each other and therefore provide a standpoint from which to view how a firm’s relations with other firms affect its corporate behaviour (Mizruchi 1996). A seminal contribution in this perspective comes from Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) who document connections between mutual fund managers and corporate board members via shared education networks. They find that portfolio managers place larger bets on connected firms and perform significantly better on these holdings relative to their nonconnected holdings. In similar vein, Hochberg et al. (2007) find that better-networked Venture Capital firms experience significantly better fund performance where they measure connections through syndication relationships. Stuart and Yim (2010) exploit the sequential timing of receiving private equity offers and provide evidence to show that companies which have directors with private equity deal exposure gained from interlocking directorships are approximately 42% more likely to receive private equity. This is indicative of gains from peer influenced information transmission in a network of interlocked boards.

**Business Group Affiliation:** In India, most firms are also organized into ‘business groups’ which is defined as a set of firms managed by a common group of insiders. The firms affiliated to business groups are single entities with individual production processes however it is quite common to find firms within such business groups sharing directors with each other. Since the nature of social interactions amongst firms sharing a business group are akin to that through board interlocks, I supplement the peer reference group to incorporate peers from same business group affiliations as well. The appendix contains more details about business groups in India.

**Industry Affiliation:** Finally, to examine heterogeneous peer effects, I also distinguish between the set of corporate network peers that belong to the same industry and those that do not. An industry affiliation of a firm is based, very simply, on a shared industrial classification. I use classifications given by the National Industrial Classification (NIC) which is the standard classification system for economic activities in India. The NIC groups together economic activities which are akin in terms of process type, raw material used and finished goods produced. The classification does not make any distinctions according to the type of ownership or type of economic organization, and except in some cases the classification does not distinguish between large scale and small scale (GOI 2004). Basically firm affiliation by industry can indicate how well as firm responds to policies of its peers who are producing the same kind of output as itself.

### 3 IDENTIFICATION

In this section I outline the identification strategy used for estimating network-based peer effects. I exploit both the the natural experiment of directors’ death or retirement *and* the structure of the network itself to secure identification. Deaths or retirement of shared directors exogenously break links that cause peer groups to change over time while the structure of the network implies that there is rich variation in the magnitude of social interactions across firms that allows for the

endogenous peer effect parameter to be structurally identified in the reduced form. I discuss in detail the issues below. First I discuss how the structure of the network aids identification such that I am able to separately identify the different types of peer effects. I then describe the natural experiment that allows me to address the issue of endogenous selection. Finally, I show how I can control for unobserved shocks that are shared over the network.

### 3.1 NETWORK STRUCTURE

This fundamental identification problem, termed *reflection problem* by Manski, makes it clear that within a linear-in-means model, identification of peer effects depends on the functional relationship in the population between the variables characterizing peer groups and those directly affecting group outcomes. In such a setting, if all individuals interact in a similar way in groups of the same size, then it is impossible to recover the parameter on the endogenous peer effect because it is perfectly collinear with the mean exogenous characteristics of the group. However in settings where social interactions are not homogenous within or across a group, it is possible to identify both the endogenous and exogenous peer effects<sup>9</sup>.

In this paper, I estimate peer effects that arise in reference groups that have a non linear social interaction structure. This structure emerges when interactions do not occur symmetrically, i.e. not everyone is related to everybody else, even within sub-populations in the same way. A well known example of such a structure is a social network. In a social network each person is linked to a select set of people but no to the entire network directly. In the firms context, it means that each firm is linked to a set of firms though shared directors and in turn their peer firms have further connections, other than the target firm. An example of such a firm network is given below – denote a network, in the form of an *adjacency matrix*<sup>10</sup>, as  $\mathbf{W}$  –:

	1	2	3
1	0	1	0
2	1	0	1
3	0	1	0

Here, Firm 1 shares a director with Firm 2 (and therefore is connected to it) but not with Firm 3. Similarly, Firm 2 is connected with Firm 1 and also with Firm 3. The matrix  $\mathbf{W}$  represents the *global*

<sup>9</sup>Lee (2007) was first to show formally that the spatial autoregressive model specification (SAR), widely used in the spatial econometrics literature, can be used to disentangle endogenous and exogenous effects if there is sufficient variation in the size of peer groups within the sample.

<sup>10</sup>A common way to represent connectivity of network graphs is through a  $n \times n$  binary symmetric matrix called an adjacency matrix. The adjacency matrix is non-zero for entries whose row-column indices correspond to a link between two individuals/firms and zero for those that have no links. Operations on the adjacency matrix also yield additional information about the network such as degree, clustering etc. For more on adjacency matrices and properties of network graph see Kolaczyk (2009).



network of all social interactions<sup>11</sup>. Within this global network we can define a local network which is a set of all firms that any given firm is *directly linked* to. I use the local network as the relevant peer group. In the above example, Firm 1's local network or peer group is Firm 2 whereas Firm 2's peer group is Firm 1 and Firm 3. In this section I use the terms local network and peer group interchangeably. In Section 7.1 I also consider interactions through indirect links thereby accounting for the entire global network. The structure of such peer groups are heterogeneous both across firms at a given time and within firms over time due to movements of directors on the board. The across firm non-linearity in interactions produce a network *structure* which ensures that the endogenous peer effect is structurally *identified*, i.e. the parameter can be separately recovered. This result is due to Bramoullé et al. (2009) who show that variation in the magnitude of social interactions in a network, produces exogenous variations in reduced form coefficients across peer groups that allow us to recover the endogenous peer effect.

Using the network structure and the peer groups contained within it, I estimate the following equation. Denote the set of firms as  $i \in \{1, \dots, F\}$ ,  $y_{it}$  denotes the outcome of firm  $i$  at time  $t$  and  $x_{it}$  is the firm's exogenous characteristic<sup>12</sup> at time  $t$ . Let  $\mathbf{N}$  denote the global network of all interactions and  $\eta$  the local networks<sup>13</sup> that are contained within  $\mathbf{N}$ . Each firm's peer group, its local network  $\eta_i$ , is of size  $n_i$ . By assumption firm  $i$  is excluded from its peer group. I assume that the network is drawn from a population of networks with a stochastic and potentially endogenous structure. I distinguish between three types of effects: an agent's outcome  $y_{it}$  is affected by (i) the mean outcome of her peer group (endogenous effects), (ii) her own characteristics, and (iii) the mean characteristics of her peer group (contextual effects):

$$y_{it} = \beta \frac{\sum_{j \in \eta_{it}} y_{jt}}{n_{it}} + \gamma x_{it} + \delta \frac{\sum_{j \in \eta_{it}} x_{jt}}{n_{it}} + \zeta_t + u_{it} \quad (1)$$

Hence,  $\beta$  captures endogenous effects and  $\delta$  contextual effects. Time fixed effects are represented by  $\zeta_t$ . I require strict exogeneity of  $x_{it}$  with respect to  $u_{it}$ .

Omitting the time subscripts for clarity, denote  $\mathbf{W}^N$  as the global network peer interaction matrix. Any  $i, j$  element within it is represented by  $w_{ij}^N$ . It is row-standardized such that  $w_{ij}^N = 1/n_i$  if firm  $i$  and  $j$  have a board interlock, i.e. share a director, and 0 otherwise. I use  $\mathbf{W}_i^N$  to denote the  $i^{th}$  row vector which is used to represent a firm  $i$ 's local network<sup>14</sup>. Its pre-multiplication with the column vector  $\mathbf{y}$  produces a firm specific peer average denoted by  $\mathbf{W}_i^N \mathbf{y}_t$ . Rewriting Eq. (1) we now get<sup>15</sup>:

<sup>11</sup> This type of a network/graph is also called an 'affiliation network'/'bipartite graph'. An affiliation network refers to the set of binary relations between individuals/entities (firms) that belong to a common group or participate in common events (shared directors).

<sup>12</sup>For ease of notation, in this section, I represent only one exogenous characteristic but the empirics take into account many exogenous characteristics that are described later.

<sup>13</sup>This terminology is consistent with much of the literature on statistical networks and discussed in Bramoullé et al. (2009).

<sup>14</sup> $\mathbf{W}_i^N$  is the  $i^{th}$  row of the  $n \times n$  matrix  $\mathbf{W}^N$ . When post multiplied by  $\mathbf{y}_t$  whose dimension is  $n \times 1$ , it produces a  $1 \times 1$  firm specific peer average.

<sup>15</sup>The use of time dependent weights matrices is not uncommon in the social networks literature. Doreian and Stokman (1996) refers to Eq. (2) as a 'processual model' and use it to detect contagion in social networks. In the spatial economet-

$$y_{it} = \beta \mathbf{W}_{it}^N \mathbf{y}_t + \gamma x_{it} + \delta \mathbf{W}_{it}^N \mathbf{x}_t + \zeta_t + u_{it} \quad (2)$$

The reduced form of Eq. (2) is given by (Lee and Yu 2011):

$$\mathbf{y}_t = (I - \beta \mathbf{W}_t^N)^{-1} (\gamma \mathbf{x}_t + \delta \mathbf{W}_t^N \mathbf{x}_t + \zeta_t) + (I - \beta \mathbf{W}_t^N)^{-1} \mathbf{u}_t \quad (3)$$

### 3.2 NON RANDOM SELECTION

The main problem with estimating network-based peer effects is that the network is endogenously formed. Endogenous tie formation will also typically induce a correlation between unobserved shocks of the firm and the firms' peers. This is especially the case when similar group of firms share directors. To see this, decompose the error from Eq (2) in the following parts:

$$u_{it} = \mu_i + v_{it} + \varepsilon_{\eta t} \quad (4)$$

$\mu_i$  represents all time invariant firm level unobservables,  $v_{it}$  contains time varying firm unobservables and  $\varepsilon_{\eta t}$  contains shocks/unobservables that are common to a firm's local network at any given time  $t$ . In such a case a non-zero coefficient on the peer influence variable could mean that these firms behave in a similar fashion because they share similar attitudes (and have sorted themselves based on that) rather than the fact that network members are influencing each other (Epple and Romano 2011). Firstly, I employ a first-difference specification to eliminate any time invariant firm unobservable,  $\mu_i$ , that may be correlated with selection or correlated unobservables. First differencing Eq (2), we get:

$$\Delta y_{it} = \beta \Delta \mathbf{W}_{it}^N \mathbf{y}_t + \gamma \Delta x_{it} + \delta \Delta \mathbf{W}_{it}^N \mathbf{x}_t + \Delta \zeta_t + \Delta u_{it} \quad (5)$$

I retain time fixed effects in this specification to capture common time specific trends. The parameter  $\beta$  represents the contemporaneous effect of peer firms. The model, therefore, captures the effect of changes in peer firms' contemporaneous outcomes on the change in a firms' outcome<sup>16</sup>.

Given Eq (5), we are still confronted with the challenges of mitigating bias arising from time varying unobservables that might influence selection into the network or time varying unobservables, such as common productivity shocks, that are correlated with the peer effect. I first take up the issue of network selection and return to the problem posed by correlated effects in the next sub-section.

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rics literature, recent work by Lee and Yu (2011) also develops quasi-maximum likelihood estimation of spatial dynamic panel data models where spatial weights matrices can be time varying.

<sup>16</sup>It is possible however that instead of responding to contemporaneous outcomes, firms respond to the permanent component associated with their peer firms' outcomes. For example, Mas and Moretti (2009) estimate a model of productivity spillovers in which the peer function takes the form where workers respond to the permanent productivity of their peer workers and over time changes in the composition of peers enables the identification of such effects. However as noted by them in the paper, both model (permanent and contemporaneous) are ex-ante possible (Mas and Moretti 2009). As in their paper, I am unable to distinguish between the effects of the two models, simply because estimating fixed effects would entail employing a peer group composition or local network fixed effect which is infeasible in the case of endogenous networks. Therefore the estimates obtained in this paper could in part be reflecting some effect of firms' response to permanent rather than contemporaneous outcomes.

To tackle selection bias, I make use of natural breaks in dynamic networks that are independent of any selection process. The idea of using exogenous variation in networks to isolate the endogenous component of the peer effect is similar to using class size variation brought about due to exogenous movement of students across schools. In the network context, it would mean having to look for local network shocks that break (or append) a tie but are external to the network or its formation. Such shocks would bring a reduction or increase in the network average outcome depending on the quality of the tie being broken (or appended) and will be uncorrelated to both the propensity to form ties and aggregate network level unobservable that affect any agents' outcome. Identifying peer effects using variations in the composition of groups is well established in the social interactions literature (Hanushek et al. (2003); Hoxby (2000)). However the strategy of using naturally induced variation in group composition to instrument for peer effects that arise from endogenously formed groups is relatively novel. Hoxby and Weingarth (2005) use policy based reassignment of students into schools that induced a shift in the composition of peers to identify the endogenous peer effect. In similar spirit but taking a different approach, Waldinger (2010) uses dismissals of scholars by the Nazi government as a source of exogenous variation in the peer group. Finally, Cooley (2007) uses introduction of student accountability policies in North Carolina public schools as an exogenous 'utility shifter' for identifying peer spillovers in education<sup>17</sup>. The common underlying idea for the identification strategy pursued in the papers discussed above, as well as in this paper, is the use of an exclusion restriction in the form of an exogenous shock that is able to alter the composition of groups or/and the peer averages.

In what follows, I provide the assumptions that describe the properties of a valid exclusion restriction such as the one described above:

- (A1) There exists a variable, representing a stochastic network shock,  $D_{it-1}$  that changes the response of firm  $i$  to choose the optimal outcome<sup>18</sup> and the composition of peers,  $\mathbf{W}_{it}^N$ , in the next period.
- (A2) The variable  $D_{it-1}$  induces a shift in both the endogenous and exogenous peer averages in the next period depending on the quality of peer loss given by,  $\mathbf{W}_{it-1}^D \mathbf{y}_{t-1}$ <sup>19</sup> (endogenous peer average shifter) or  $\mathbf{W}_{it-1}^D \mathbf{x}_{t-1}$  (exogenous peer average shifter).
- (A3) Conditional on  $(x_{it}, \varepsilon_{\eta t})$ ,  $v_{it}$  is independent of  $D_{it-1}$ .
- (A4) Conditional on  $(x_{it})$ ,  $\varepsilon_{\eta t}$ ,  $v_{it}$  are jointly independent of  $\mathbf{W}_{it-1}^D \mathbf{y}_{t-1}$ ,  $\mathbf{W}_{it-1}^D \mathbf{x}_{t-1}$ .

(A1) ensures that there are no direct spillovers from the network shock  $D_{it-1}$ . This means that  $D_{it-1}$  affects the composition of peers and is capable of having a direct effect on the outcome


<sup>17</sup>The author uses the percentage of students held accountable in any given year to predict average peer achievement in the classroom. The assumption is that the percentage of students in danger of failing is independent of both group level and individual level unobservables.

<sup>18</sup>Note that  $D_{it-1}$  does not directly enter a standard production function.

<sup>19</sup>Superscript  $D$  indicates the subset of past period peers who have been lost as a result of shock  $D_{it-1}$ .  $\mathbf{W}_{it-1}^D \mathbf{y}_{t-1}$  can also be written as  $\bar{\mathbf{y}}_{-it-1}^D$  indicating the average outcomes of peers who have been lost. I describe in detail the construction of the peer average shifters in the subsequent pages.

but only by changing the response of the firm in reaction to the event. Note that the change in peer composition shifts *both* the exogenous and endogenous peer averages requiring, still, a non-linear social interaction structure that allows for separability of the exogenous and endogenous peer average shifters<sup>20</sup>. In a linear-in means model, where interactions take place in groups of the same size, this type of an exclusion would be ineffective, since neither the exogenous/endogenous peer effects nor the exogenous/endogenous peer shifters are individually separable. (A2) clarifies this by indexing the network shock to be firm specific i.e. it represents a *local network* shock. (A3) requires that the shock be uncorrelated with firm specific unobservables in the next time period.

Death or retirements of directors which induce a pair-wise break in links, present this sort of a local network shock in the given context. A death or retirement of a director has two potential effects. It can directly affect the behaviour/outcome of the firm due to a loss of an employee and his/her productive input to firm policies. Indirectly, if the firm participates in board interlocks and shares the director it would result in a broken link. In this case, if the firm loses opportunities to interact (through board interlocking) with a high quality firm it would result in a reduction in overall network average in the next period i.e. the loss of a firm with high outcome values in period  $t$  leads to a reduction in the average in period  $t + 1$ . I control for the direct effect of director death or retirement and use this death induced reduction to average outcomes due to broken firm linkages as an instrument. This implies that identification requires only that there be no systematic differences in director exits that break interlocks and those that do not (i.e. director exits of unconnected directors). The first stage will essentially compute a difference-in-difference estimate for those firms that experienced the shock in each time period. As an example, consider the following figure (below): the network in time  $t$  evolves to a new structure in time  $t + 1$ . Two links have been broken and one new link has been appended. However, only one link has broken due to a shared director death or retirement (in white) – I identify, only this type of pair-wise link deletions.



The objective is to construct a variable that can predict the gain or loss to the next period average,  $t + 1$ , due to death or retirement induced link exits.  $D_{it}$  is a binary variable that indicates whether firm  $i$  experiences death or retirement of one or more directors. At given time  $t$ , let  $W_{it}^D$  denote the subset of past period peers who have been lost as a result of shock  $D_{it}$ ; its elements are defined as

<sup>20</sup>I thank Jane Cooley for pointing this out.

follows:

$$w_{ij,t}^D = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } i \text{ and } j \text{ lose a } \underline{\text{shared}} \text{ director due to } D_{it}, D_{jt} = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

**Endogenous Effects:** To instrument for the endogenous peer effect in time  $t$  I use the average outcomes of lost peers (due to death or retirement of shared directors) in time period  $t - 1$ , given by  $\mathbf{W}_{it-1}^D \mathbf{y}_{t-1}$ . This variable measures the ‘quality’ of peer loss. An increase in the average outcomes of lost peers should reduce the next period average. I provide an example of this in Figure (1). The figure plots the network average investment of an example firm over time. This firm experiences a local network shock – the death or retirement of directors that break network links – at two given points of time (indicated by the dark circles). The fall in average network investment due to these network shocks is greater in 2001-2002 as compared to 2004-2005. It is easy to see that this is because the average outcomes of lost peers ( $\mathbf{W}^D \mathbf{y}$ ) is much higher in 2001 (5.45) as compared to 2004 (1.95). This indicates that higher values of  $\mathbf{W}_{it-1}^D \mathbf{y}_{t-1}$  lead to lower next period averages  $\mathbf{W}_{it}^N \mathbf{y}_t$ .

**Exogenous Effects:** Similarly, to instrument for the exogenous effects I use the average exogenous characteristics of lost peers, given by  $\mathbf{W}_{it-1}^D \mathbf{x}_{t-1}$ .

With these as instruments I estimate the following system using two stage least squares. Explicitly controlling for the direct effect of the shock  $D_{it-1}$  in Eq. (5), the equation of interest is given by:

$$\Delta y_{it} = \beta \Delta \mathbf{W}_{it}^N \mathbf{y}_t + \gamma \Delta x_{it} + \tau \Delta D_{it-1} + \delta \Delta \mathbf{W}_{it}^N \mathbf{x}_t + \Delta \zeta_t + \Delta u_{it} \quad (7)$$

The first stage equations for the endogenous and exogenous peer variables are:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \mathbf{W}_{it}^N \mathbf{y}_t &= \theta^{f1} \Delta \mathbf{W}_{it-1}^D \mathbf{y}_{t-1} + \vartheta^{f1} \Delta \mathbf{W}_{it-1}^D \mathbf{x}_{t-1} + \gamma^{f1} \Delta x_{it} + \tau^{f1} \Delta D_{it-1} + \Delta \zeta_t^{f1} + \Delta u_{it}^{f1} \\ \Delta \mathbf{W}_{it}^N \mathbf{x}_t &= \theta^{f2} \Delta \mathbf{W}_{it-1}^D \mathbf{y}_{t-1} + \vartheta^{f2} \Delta \mathbf{W}_{it-1}^D \mathbf{x}_{t-1} + \gamma^{f2} \Delta x_{it} + \tau^{f2} \Delta D_{it-1} + \Delta \zeta_t^{f2} + \Delta u_{it}^{f2} \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

Finally, identification requires that the quality of peer loss ( $\mathbf{W}_{it-1}^D(\cdot)$ ) be independent of both  $v_{it}$  and  $\varepsilon_{\eta t}$  as maintained in Assumption (A4)<sup>21</sup>. Independence with  $v_{it}$  could be violated for instance if firms choose to strategically replace the lost directors with directors of equally well connected companies. This could be if firms that witnessed shared director deaths are more likely to form new links in the next period. In section (6.1) I verify that this is not the case and that the effect of a shared director death is insignificant in predicting the probability of new links. Moreover, I am able to control for the direct effect of director death or retirement on the firm’s outcome since not all

<sup>21</sup>An easy way to see that it holds is to examine the instrument validity condition<sup>22</sup>; omitting the individual subscript and first difference operators:

$$\begin{aligned} E[(\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D \mathbf{y}_{t-1})' \mathbf{u}_t] &= E[(\mathbf{y}_{t-1})' (\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D)' \mathbf{u}_t] \\ &= E[\underbrace{(\mathbf{y}_{t-1})'}_A \underbrace{((\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D)' \mathbf{u}_t)}_B] = 0 \end{aligned}$$

Using the fact that that the network  $W^N$  and therefore  $W^D$  is symmetric, a simple reformulation of the original exclusion shows that the validity condition holds because the average disturbances of lost peers in **time t** (vector B) are uncorrelated with the vector of own outcomes in **time t - 1** (vector A). See Appendix A.1 for details.

death or retirement are of shared directors. I discuss the independence of  $\varepsilon_{\eta t}$  and the constructed instrument in the following subsection.

### 3.3 CORRELATED EFFECTS

The presence of correlated unobservables within a firm's local network could bias the peer effects estimates. Correlated effects could arise due to a number of reasons such as common productivity shocks (if the peer firm was in the same industry as the target firm), change in business group policies ((if the peer firm was in the same business group as the target firm) or other shared director related shocks. I can classify local network peers of any firms into three types: those that belong to the same Industry ( $I$ ), those that belong to the same business group ( $G$ ) and the remaining that do not belong to either the firms' industry or business group ( $I \setminus G$ ). On average 62.45% of network links are peers who belong to the same industry or same business group. Using this property and to clarify the issue more, I further decompose the error by dividing  $\varepsilon_{\eta t}$  into three parts:

$$\varepsilon_{\eta t} = \varepsilon_{\eta t}^I + \varepsilon_{\eta t}^G + \varepsilon_{\eta t}^{I \setminus G} \quad (9)$$

where  $\varepsilon_{\eta t}^I$  represents the industry level common unobservables,  $\varepsilon_{\eta t}^G$  represents the business group level common unobservables and  $\varepsilon_{\eta t}^{I \setminus G}$  represents the residual. To eliminate the first two terms I use *both* industry by year and business group by time fixed effects. The resulting specification is (omitting the first stage):

$$\Delta y_{it} = \beta \Delta \mathbf{W}_{it}^N \mathbf{y}_t + \gamma \Delta x_{it} + \tau \Delta D_{it-1} + \delta \Delta \mathbf{W}_{it}^N \mathbf{x}_t + \Delta \zeta_t + \Delta \phi_{It} + \Delta \tau_{Gt} + \Delta v_{it} + \Delta \varepsilon_{\eta t}^{I \setminus G} \quad (10)$$

where  $\phi_{It}$  and  $\tau_{Gt}$  represent industry by year and business group by time fixed effects that will be estimated. This specification also allows us to control for both industry and business group level fundamentals that may be driving the outcome of interest<sup>23</sup>. The remaining correlated unobservable,  $\varepsilon_{\eta t}^{I \setminus G}$ , are not systematically related to any firm specific pre-defined group. Even then, the identification strategy pursued in this paper will provide consistent estimates of the peer effects since past period peers that dropped out due to death of shared directors are no longer in the peer group of the next period and therefore do not share the same unobserved shocks/correlations. Note that I require  $\varepsilon_{\eta t}^{I \setminus G}$  to be serially uncorrelated. I relax this assumption later by constructing instruments which can accommodate various forms of network based serial correlation that essentially proxy for the original instrument (past outcomes of lost peers). The results are robust to the use of these alternative instruments; details are provided in Appendix (A.1).

<sup>23</sup>Note that given the panel dimension of my data which contains ten time periods and about two thousand industry and business groups, I am only able to estimate full industry by year and business group by year fixed effects in separate specifications. However, to estimate both industry and business group by time fixed effects, I define a time period as two year spells and interact them with both industry and business groups indicators to estimate industry by year and business group by time fixed effects. While slightly restrictive, this is the most feasible alternative to capture industry and group time invariant shocks together.

## 4 DATA

My primary source of data is the PROWESS database provided by the Center for Monitoring of the Indian Economy (CMIE). Prowess includes annual report information for around 29,000 companies in India from 1989 to the present year. It provides detailed balance sheets, financial statements, industry information and group affiliation for each firm, corporate ownership data, share prices, and other relevant data for publicly traded Indian corporations. In this paper, I use an (un-balanced) panel of all Indian private sector firms that are publicly traded ("listed firms") – both on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and the National Stock Exchange (NSE)– from the period 1998-2010. As in other papers (Khanna and Palepu 2000, Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan 2002), I rely on CMIE classification of firms into group and nongroup firms, and of group firms into specific group affiliation which is based on a "continuous monitoring of company announcements and a qualitative understanding of the group wise behaviour of individual companies" (CMIE 2010, pg. 4). For identifying industry affiliation, I use information on the principal line of activity of the firm and use the National Industry Classification (NIC) code accorded to them. This is similar to the SIC classifications of firms in the UK and US. The PROWESS data also provides detailed information on the directors serving on the board of each firm, along with information on the number of board meeting attended, salary, directors' fee etc. The listing of these directors is unique within each time period and I undertake an exhaustive matching exercise to ensure uniqueness even across time periods.

My second source of data comes from a Bombay Stock Exchange led initiative called Directors' Database ([www.directorsdatabase.com](http://www.directorsdatabase.com)) and maintained by Prime Database of India. The data contains individual as well as firm level information on all directors including the director's educational qualifications; the director's position in the board (for example promoter director, managing director, non-executive director, independent director, etc.); whether the director satisfies the definition of being independent according to the guidelines laid out by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI); the other public and private firms in which the director is a board member. Importantly, it contains separate information about cessations of every director in the boards of all listed firms which includes the name of each director who ceased to be a board member, the date of such cessation and the reason for such cessations (end of nomination, resignation, demise etc.) (Chakrabarti et. al, 2010).

Based on the above two data sources I construct time-varying networks for all the listed firms in my data-set. Figures (2) & (3) provide a summary of the network topology and its evolution over time. I find, consistent with many studies (see Kossinets and Watts 2006), that these network graphs experience a fair amount of stability over time. Figure (2) shows that the degree and clustering coefficient witness a slight upward trend. Figure (3) summarizes the number of director appointments & cessations for each firm along-with the corresponding link additions and deletions. On average about 4.5 links are deleted/lost and 1 new link is added. The last panel in this figure also shows the average number of death or retirement related lost links (approximately 0.5 links ) in each time

period. Death and retirements related link deletions account for about 10% of all link deletions.

The focus of this paper lies in analyzing the impact of firm networks on their investment, pay-scale and expenditure decisions, which are measured as follows. I make a distinction between two types of investments, corporate market investment and physical capital expenditure. I focus mainly on corporate market investments for two reasons<sup>24</sup>. Firstly, there has been an increasing trend over the last decade whereby firms have increased their holdings of liquid assets in marketable securities, either with a view to procure strategic equity stakes or to smoothen their risk portfolio<sup>25</sup>. Secondly, there is a large theoretical literature that focuses on social interactions in finance, particularly investments, through models of herding and information cascades. In these models, investment decisions may be influenced by observing the decisions of others and this leads to a convergence or divergence of behaviour. Behavioural responses of such kind are more likely to be dynamic in nature and involve taking decisions on expenditure items that can be easily modified. Corporate market investments satisfy this criterion because in contrast to physical capital expenditure, they are more liquid and managerial decisions on portfolio adjustment tend to be more flexible. Market investment is defined as the sum of all firm investments in equity shares, preference shares, debt instruments (issued by the government or by non-government entities, or of short-term or long-term nature), mutual funds and approved securities. Investments made by investment companies that are engaged entirely, or essentially, in the business of purchase and sale of securities for making profits from these are not included in this data field. Investments of such companies are treated as stock in trade and not investments. For robustness I consider also investments made by the company in only securities that are listed on securities exchanges; such securities are called "quoted" securities<sup>26</sup>.

Executive compensation is the remuneration paid to company executives and it includes the amount of salary paid, contribution to provident fund, value of perquisites, performance linked incentive to whole time directors and also the commission paid to them. It does not include the sitting fees paid to the directors for attending board meetings. Capital Expenditure is measured as the total expenditure incurred during the setting up of a new plant or a new project up to the date of the commercial production. Current R&D expenditure is measured by the total outlay of the company on research and development during the year on its current account.

The specification also controls for several firm exogenous characteristics. I include total profit before depreciation, interest, tax and amortisation; total book value of assets (in logs); total sales of a company (in logs). All the control variables are lagged by one year. I also control for the number of director exits. This refers to the number of directors who have left the company in the previous

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<sup>24</sup>I also explain peer effects in capital expenditure but due to the lumpiness of physical investment, I transform capital expenditure into a dummy variable which is equal to one if there is investment in capital/infrastructure and zero if not.

<sup>25</sup>For example [Brown \(2009\)](#) argues that this form of investment is not merely equivalent to a simple store of cash; rather it serves as value enhancement. He finds evidence firms may use market investment as a risk management tool as well as to manage future financial commitments and payout policy. [Allen and Phillips \(2000\)](#) examine block equity ownership patterns of US corporations and note that, among other things, purchasing corporations could be able to effectively monitor or influence management since they are in possession of superior knowledge relative to other shareholders.

<sup>26</sup>Investment in mutual fund is also treated as quoted investment even if not listed on the exchanges as their fair price is available and are easily marketable



time period. To measure scale effects I also include a total network size variable that measures the number of direct links i.e. the number of other firms with whom it shares common directors.

## 5 RESULTS

I now report results of industry and network peer effects on firm policies. I first provide descriptive evidence that network peer groups matter. Figures (4) & (5) present nonparametric plots of a firms' investment expenditure and executive compensation against network peer averages of the same. In both graphs firms' outcomes are increasing in their peers' performance. Table (1) provides summary statistics over all time periods for the variables used in the analysis.

### 5.1 NETWORK PEER EFFECTS

**Corporate Market Investment:** Table 2 shows the results for peer effects in corporate market investment from estimating Equation (2) using OLS and the two stage least squares using the instrument described in Section 3.2 above. Both the outcome variable and the endogenous peer variable are in logs. In the following results I control for the assets of each firm but in unreported results I also asset normalize the investment variable; the results are unchanged. Column (1) shows OLS results not accounting for potential bias in selection or unobserved network shocks. There is a positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with the endogenous peer effects. Other control variables are also statistically significant: changes in profits, assets and sales are all associated with a positive growth in corporate market investment as expected.

I now discuss the instrumental variable results. Column (2) reports the first stage of the two stage least squares procedure. Recall that the instrument I use is the average outcome of death induced deleted links in the past period,  $W^D Mkt. Invst.$  Exits of peers with high outcome values is likely to reduce the average in the next period (net of other endogenous deletions and additions) because they no longer contribute to this average. The first stage results confirm this; a one unit increase in the average investment of lost peers (due to death or retirement) leads to a 6.4% reduction to the next period average investment (of existing network peers). The coefficient is statistically significant at 1%. This result suggests that firms are unable to immediately replace dead/retired directors with equally well connected new directors so as to restore their links. Moreover, the instrument is highly informative as the first stage F statistic is 124.2. Therefore the endogenous peer effect is not 'weakly identified'<sup>27</sup>.

Column (3) & Column (4) report second stage results under different specifications. Generally, the results show a large increase in the coefficient of peer effects. Now, an increase of one standard deviation in a firm's network peers has almost twice the effect on the outcome relative to the OLS specification. An increase of one standard deviation of the endogenous effects leads to an increase

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<sup>27</sup> "Weak identification" arises when the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors, but only weakly.

of 0.16 standard deviations in the growth of market investment. All the conditioning variables, remain statistically significant throughout. Note that the coefficient on the director exit is statistically insignificant which would imply that exits of directors have no direct independent effect on the outcome. One reason for finding a downward bias in the OLS estimates is that selection related unobservables could be negatively correlated with the outcome. For instance, an average performing firm (in terms of market investment) may strategically link with high performing firms. This firm thereby has a large average peer outcome value despite the fact that its own outcome is low. In this way strategic responses, as unobservables, could be positively correlated with high peer outcome values while being negatively correlated with own outcome values. Results from an OLS specification will therefore tend to underestimate the endogenous peer effect.

Column (5) reports results that include contextual effects. For corporate market investment, none of the contextual effects are significant. The endogenous peer effect is still statistically significant and slightly larger in magnitude. This is not however the general pattern and in other results I discuss the interpretation of contextual effects where they are found to be significant. Finally, Column (6) adds scale effects separately. The average network peer effect implicitly captures the scale effect since it normalizes the peer total by network size. I control for the firm size by including firm sales; therefore if larger have more directors and hence larger networks, the sales variable will potentially already capture some effect of the network size. Even then, there might be concern that the size of the network directly enters the model and so I calculate in each period the number of local network peers that a firm is linked with and include this in the regression. The network size variable is endogenous due to the above mentioned concerns of non random selection into the network and the existence of other unobservables. Here again, I rely on the death or retirement induced local network shocks and instrument network size in the current period with the number of firms lost due to death or retirement of common directors in the previous period. In unreported results, I find that the instrument is significantly negatively correlated with the endogenous network size variable as expected. Column (6) shows that the network size variable is not significant, after controlling for firm size, endogenous and exogenous peer effects. Table (6) further strengthens the results by eliminating industry and business group specific shocks. I find that both the magnitude and significance of the endogenous peer effects, as reported in Column (1) of Table (6: A & B) remain unchanged even after accounting for industry by business group by time fixed effects.

**Executive Compensation:** Table 3 shows the results for peer effects in executive compensation. As before, both the outcome variable and the endogenous peer variable are in logs. Column (1) shows OLS results not accounting for potential bias in selection or unobserved network shocks. There is a positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with the endogenous peer effects. Both, a change in assets and sales, are associated with a positive growth in executive compensation. Column (2) reports the first stage of the two stage least squares procedure. The first stage results show that a one unit increase in the average compensation of lost peers (due to death or retirement) leads to an 8.9% reduction to the next period average. The coefficient is statistically significant at 1% and the instrument is strongly correlates with the endogenous variable (Cragg Donald F statistic in the

first stage is 178.946). Column (3) & Column (4) report second stage results under different specifications (as above). Generally, the results show a large increase in the coefficient of peer effects. An increase of one standard deviation of the endogenous effects leads to an increase of 0.05 standard deviations in the growth of executive compensation.

Column (5) includes contextual effects. It shows that the average profits of peer firms negatively affects the growth of executive compensation of any given firm, however the coefficient is quite small and close to zero. In general, the interpretation of contextual effects is fraught with ambiguity. Cooley (2009) provides a detailed discussion on the specification and interpretation of contextual effects in the classroom/child learning context. She argues that higher values of peer exogenous characteristics might reduce own outcome values if there are positive spillovers from endogenous peer effects and we condition on this. For instance, extending the argument in the firm setting, consider a firm whose executive compensation levels are increasing in its peer's compensation levels as well as own profits. This implies that *controlling for the firm's own profits and peer firms' compensation levels* any increase in peer profitability should decrease own compensation levels. This is because the firm will require an increase in effort from its own executives to match up to the profits of its peer firms (and therefore reduce compensation until effort is increased and profit is matched), for any given own profit level and peer compensation level. Apart from peer firm profits I find no other significant contextual effects. Finally, Column (6) includes scale effects separately however the coefficient on network size is not significant. As before, I account for industry and business group level unobservable in Table (6). Column (2) of Table (6: A & B) reports these results and I find similar results to those reported above.

**Capital Expenditure & R&D expenditure:** Table 4 reports results for peer effects in capital expenditure and it is quite similar to the market investment results (in the final contextual effects specification) discussed before. Interestingly, the endogenous peer effect on capital expenditure is positive but statistically significant only with the inclusion of contextual effects. Table 5 reports results for peer effects in current R&D expenditure. I find no significant network effects in current R&D expenditure in either of the specifications.

## 5.2 HETEROGENEITY

In order to distinguish between the different types of peers *within local networks*, I disaggregate the overall peer effect between industry network peers and non-industry network peers. This is important because there may be differences in how a firm *responds* to the behaviour of peer firms within the network who belong to its own industry compared to those that do not belong to the same. The disaggregation also helps establish channels through which peer effects operate if we assume that the nature of interactions are distinct and separable between the two sets of peers<sup>28</sup>. Although the precise qualitative nature of peer effects is hard to pin down, it is possible to distinguish the different types of interactions between the groups using some insight from economic theory.

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<sup>28</sup>There is recent and growing literature that identifies the mechanisms of peer effects by decomposing its effect between pre-defined groups of interest. See Cohen-Cole and Zanella (2008) and Lavy and Schlosser (2007) as examples.

Economic theory on firms typically considers interactions amongst industry peers to be competitive. In contrast firm strategic alliances are theorized to be benevolent and more collaborative in nature. There is an extensive literature on such network-based firm interactions wherein firms collude and cooperate to share information and resources (Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001); Belleflamme and Bloch (2004)). This implies that if corporate peer effects are based on information diffusion, firms may be less willing to trust information received from industry network peers (as compared to non-industry network peers) and as a result not respond to the behaviour of this set. However if one were to find positive and significant peer effects from industry network peers then it could potentially imply that, keeping with the competitive spirit, firms *mimic* behaviours of these peers. In Section 7.2 I distinguish between effects of industry peers which comprise all other peers in a firms industry and distinguish it from the overall network peer effect (containing both industry and non-industry within network peers). The present exercise is different from Section 7.2 in that it tests for the differences in peer effects only *within* the overall network – between industry network peers and non-industry network peers. In a sense this distinction precludes any comparison between industry and overall network peer effects because network peers also contain industry peers and vice versa. I therefore first seek to understand how even within the network firms differentially respond between industry and non-industry peers.

Table 7 reports results that decomposes the peer effects as discussed. I present results only on market investments and executive compensation since these are the two outcomes for which I do find significant peer effects. The first two columns of both outcomes report the two first stage results. Recall that the instrument is the average past period outcomes of delinked peers due to death or retirement. In order to find separate peer effects by industry and non-industry peers, I also decompose the instrument to separate loss to the average next period outcome due to delinked industry peers and those due to delinked non-industry peers. Both the instruments work well in predicting the two outcomes and are orthogonal to each other. An exit of industry network peers with high outcome values reduces the industry network average in the next period and has no effect on the non-industry network average in the next period. The same applies for non-industry network peer exits. In general the joint Cragg-Donald F-stat is high implying that both instruments are strong and informative. I now focus on discussing peer effects from different sources. The results show that in both cases, industry network peer effects ( $W^{NI}$ ) are statistically insignificant while non-industry network peer effects ( $W^{NN}$ ) are positive and significant. An increase of one standard deviation of the *endogenous non-industry network peer effects* leads to an increase of 0.16 standard deviations in the growth of market investments and 0.05 standard deviations in the growth of executive compensation. The coefficient on endogenous industry network peer effects is close to zero. This indicates that the bulk of network peer effects derive from a firms association with other non-industry firms. However a firm can have interactions with a wide range of firms within its own industry outside of its corporate network. It is therefore important to account and distinguish these market based interactions from the non-market based interactions (corporate networks) discussed up till now. This is developed further in Section 7.2.

### 5.3 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

To understand the implications of peer effects, I use the estimated parameters to simulate simple counterfactuals. In the first instance, I compare the distribution of expected mean values of both investment and executive compensation growth to the observed sample mean when interlocks are prohibited<sup>29</sup>. Next, I compare the distribution of expected mean values to the observed sample means when *within industry* interlocks are prohibited. Results from the two experiments are shown in Figure 6. The figure plots the histogram of simulated expected values and compares it to the observed mean. The mean expected value (simulated) is given by dashed line while the observed mean is given by the solid line. Mean expected values fall much below the observed sample mean for both investment and executive compensation growth when all interlocks are prohibited i.e when network peer interactions are restricted. The difference in investment growth with and without network peer interactions is almost 2% and is statistically significant. In contrast, restricting within industry interlocks has no significant effect on altering the distribution of outcomes. The difference in the observed sample mean and the mean of the simulated expected values by setting industry network peer interactions to null is close to zero and statistically indistinguishable. Thus a regulator wishing to restrict within industry interlocks would find no significant change in the mean values of either investment or executive compensation growth.

### 5.4 INVESTMENT: STOCK LEVEL ANALYSIS

In order to pin down the exact nature of corporate market investment peer effects, I make use of detailed information on each stock that a company has invested in over several years<sup>30</sup>. The previous section established that companies are influenced by their peers in their choice (nature and volume) of stock market investment. I refine the result now by tracking stock-wise activity of every firm in relation with its networked and industry peers over time. Specifically I estimate whether, for any two companies, the probability of investing in the same stock in any given time periods is increasing in the strength of their network ties. Denote the set of stocks of any company  $i$  at time  $t$  as  $R_{it}$ . I match the set of stocks for every pair in the sample ( $R_{it}$  and  $R_{jt}$ ) to see whether there is at least one stock that is common to both. Let  $Y_{ij}$  denote the existence of a common stock between firm  $i$  and  $j$ ; the equation of interest is:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_1 N_{ijt} + \beta_2 I_{ijt} + \gamma X_{it,jt} + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (11)$$

I estimate pair-wise or dyadic regressions where the unit of analysis is a pair of two companies  $i$  and  $j$ <sup>31</sup>. The dependent variable is binary taking the value 1 if both  $i$  and  $j$  have invested in the

<sup>29</sup>In order to take into account estimation uncertainty, I follow the procedure outlined in King et al. (2000) and simulate parameters corresponding to the specification in Table (6: B). I then constrain the network peer averages to zero (or industry network peer averages to be zero in the second experiment) and set the values of all other explanatory variables to their mean values. In the final step, I simulate the distribution of expected values by taking a random draw from the posterior distribution of model parameters at the given values of the explanatory variables.

<sup>30</sup>Detailed stock information is available for bulk of the listed companies in PROWESS only from the year 2006. Data for previous years exist but only for a selected few companies. Therefore in order for the results to be representative of the publicly listed sample as well to make the analysis computationally feasible I use only the years 2006-2010 for analysis

<sup>31</sup>Standard errors are adjusted using the QAP procedure to account for pair-wise dependence.

same stock in time period  $t$ . *Network Strength*,  $N_{ijt}$  indicates the value of connection between  $i$  and  $j$  and ranges from zero to one. It is equal to the inverse of path distance in the global network between  $i$  and  $j$  – zero indicates no connection and one indicates direct connection. All other values mean that  $i, j$  are connected but through a series of intermediate links. I also includes a vector of pair-specific controls (differences in their profits, sales and assets),  $X_{it,jt}$ . Finally I also capture whether the probability of investing in the same stock is correlated with sharing a common industry,  $I_{ijt}$ . I use a dyadic framework for analysis because it allows incorporating the several thousands of stocks that exist in the entire sample, matching effectively the stock sets of different companies. Although this framework is unable to distinguish whether company  $j$  is influenced by company  $i$  to invest in the same stock, it is informative of the *similarity* in the patterns of stock-wise investment of both companies. I also instrument for the potential endogeneity of the network strength variable by using director exits due to death or retirement. This follows the same idea as all previous analysis, wherein I use a variable that takes the value one if there are any common directors over the network between  $i$  and  $j$  who have died or retired in the previous time period to instrument for the strength of network tie between  $i$  and  $j$  in the current time period.

Table (8) reports results from this analysis. Column (1) reports simple OLS results. It shows that an increase in network tie between  $i$  and  $j$  from zero to one increases the probability of investing in the same stock by approx. 9%. Absolute differences in both profits and assets also increase the probability of investing in the same stock. It is interesting to note that sharing the same industry (indication of industry peers) also increases the probability of investing in the same stock – by about 4%. Since the occurrence of investing in the same stock is quite low<sup>32</sup> across the whole universe of dyads, I also employ a rare events a logit estimator to account for the underestimation in the probabilities associated with such an event. I follow the procedure outlined in King and Zeng (2001) to estimate bias-corrected parameter estimates and standard errors<sup>33</sup>. The results show that network strength effect is associated with a coefficient of 1.63. this means that a change in network strength from 0 to 1 (no connection to direct connection) increases the probability of investing in the same stock by 11%. The relative risk associated with this change on the probability of same stock investment is 4.56 log-odds. Column (3) incorporates pair fixed effects to control for pair specific correlated unobservables; network strength still remains positive and significant. Finally I report instrumental variable results. The first stage, Column (4), shows that a global network shared director exit (due to death or retirement) is associated with a fall in network strength of about 0.05 units and this effect is statistically significant<sup>34</sup>. The second stage results, both random effects and fixed effects show a positive and significant effect of network strength, much higher in magnitude compared to the OLS results, on the probability of investing in a similar stock.

<sup>32</sup>Investment in same stock takes the value 1 in approx 4% of dyad-year observations.

<sup>33</sup>Briefly, the method incorporates three corrections into ordinal logistic regression: choice based sampling giving greater weight to positive events, prior correction on the dependent variable based on the representation of the positive event within the population and amplification of the probability by a correction factor. For more details on this procedure see King and Zeng (2001).

<sup>34</sup>The instrument also satisfies the criteria for a strong informative instrument; the first stage Cragg Donald F statistic is over 100.

## 6 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

### 6.1 THREATS TO IDENTIFICATION

Identification of network effects relies solely on the occurrence of death or retirement related local network shocks. The validity of the instruments could be violated if network shocks are binding, having a direct effect on the outcomes, or if firms choose to strategically replace lost *shared* directors with equally well connected directors. Under these conditions, network shocks are no longer excludable and firms, by strategically responding to the network shock, are likely to form new links in the next period. I first test whether network shocks are binding by examining the direct effect of the network shock on outcome variables controlling for endogenous and exogenous peer averages. In the test that follows, I separate director exits due to death/retirement in two ways: director exits due to death/retirements *exclusive of shared director exits* ('firm shock') and director exits due to death/retirements of shared director exits. Table (9) reports results from this test. Identification holds if network shocks affect the outcome, but only *indirectly*, through the loss of peers; conditional on peer effects a network shock should not have any direct effect on the outcome. The results show that for both corporate market investment and executive compensation, loss of shared directors due to death/retirement – a firm's networks shock – has no direct effect. More importantly, the coefficients on network shock in both specifications is close to zero and equal to the coefficient on *firm shock*. This indicates that firms experience no differential effect on its outcome from the loss of a *shared* director versus that of any other director and that network shocks only affect the firm's outcome indirectly.

Next, in order to test if this is the case or not, I run a simple difference-in-difference regression comparing the network dynamics of firms that lose connections due to death or retirement induced director exits to other firms. The objective is to determine whether firms that experience death or retirement shock in time  $t - 1$  are more likely to form new links in time  $t$ . Table (10) reports results on this regression. I find no significant effect of a death shock in the past period on the probability of forming new links and this result holds even after controlling for other firm level factors (sales, assets etc.). The results also show that all the time fixed effects are jointly highly significant in predicting the propensity to form new links. This suggests that there the increasing trend over time to form new links and that this is independent of whether a firm experiences link loss due to death/retirement of shared directors.

### 6.2 NETWORK MEASUREMENT: MONTE CARLO

Throughout the analysis I measure inter-firm network connections between all listed companies in India. However it is true that the directors of each listed company also serve on boards of non-listed companies. Since these non-listed companies are not part of the sample, the network omits linkages between listed and non-listed companies thereby inducing a potential measurement error. In this section, I provide some Monte Carlo evidence to assess the sensitivity of my results to such network related measurement error. To do so I consider a population of two types of firms: listed and non-

listed<sup>35</sup>. The objective is to compare an estimated value of the parameter obtained from ‘sampling’ a network to the true population parameter. Here, a sample network refers to a subset of the original population network from drawing a sample of all listed companies.

There are three types of links in the population: links between a pair of listed companies (*‘listed links’*), links between a listed company and non-listed company (*‘mixed links’*) and links between a pair of non-listed companies (*‘non-listed links’*). To assess the bias arising from partially enumerating links of listed companies, I use controlled network topology driven Monte Carlo experiments similar to Páez, Scott, and Volz (2008). Details of the procedure are outlined in the Appendix A.2. In the first experiment I control the density of listed links (henceforth listed-density), measured as the proportion of listed links to the total number of links in the population, and the sample size i.e. the proportion of listed companies in the sample, in order to simulate various population networks. I then extract the sample networks (all listed links) to estimate the peer effect parameter and compare it to the true population parameter.

Table (14) reports results from these simulations. Overall, I find that this type of measurement error induces a *downward bias* i.e. the estimated parameters tend to be lower than the true population parameter. Figure (7) plots a heat-map of the root mean square errors (henceforth RMSE). It shows that, for  $\beta = 0.2$ , the values of RMSE increase as the listed-density and size fall; higher values of RMSE are indicated by (progressively) dark shades of blue. For most the RMSE is quite low but increases sharply only at listed-density lower than 0.1. At this level and for a sample size equal to 20% of the population, the RMSE is 0.08. The maximum RMSE, 0.40, is reached with a sample size of 10% and listed-density of 3%. In the second experiment, I explore bias associated with a homophilic tendency to form links<sup>36</sup>. Homophily in this context arises when listed firms are more likely to form links (or share directorates) with other listed firms. Higher homophilic tendency should decrease the extent of measurement error because it limits the extent of mixed link omissions. Therefore even at low listed link densities, a sufficiently high degree of homophily can reduce the extent of bias. To examine this, I introduce an additional topological parameter, degree of homophily, and vary it to arrive at different network configurations. The homophily parameter measures the distribution of links that listed companies have between listed links (intra-group links) and mixed links (inter-group links). For example a value of 0.5 indicates that 50% of all links that listed companies have are amongst themselves. Table (15) reports results from varying the homophily parameter at a given level of sampling size and listed-density. There is a downward bias even in this case. Figure (8) summarizes the results; it shows that at  $\beta = 0.2$  and sample size of 20% , the bias steadily increases as the homophily parameter and listed-density fall.

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<sup>35</sup>Note that here the population is assumed to derive from the set of all directors that serve on boards of listed companies. The simulations deal with sampling issues caused by partial enumeration of links from a bipartite graph (defined in Footnote 11). Therefore I consider the list of directors to represent the entire universe of groups or events, and assess the measurement error induced by omitting links (and therefore firms) that share common affiliation with any of these directors. This type of measurement issue is also commonly referred to as the ‘Boundary Specification’ problem in relation to bipartite graphs (Kossinets 2006). In particular, I abstract from the possibility that there are additional ‘non-listed links’ due to non listed companies sharing common directors who do not serve on the boards of listed companies. This exercise is beyond the scope of this paper but is an interesting research agenda for the future.

<sup>36</sup>Homophily refers to a tendency for similar people to link up with each other.



To assess the significance of these results, I construct a quasi-population network from the observed data. I am able to do this because the data provides information on all non-listed companies that a director of any listed company serves on. I append information on links to non-listed companies to the original network to get an approximate estimate of the true population network. I find that listed companies represent about 15% of the full list of companies. The proportion of listed links to total links is approximately 0.7, while the degree of homophily is 0.18. Assuming that the true population parameter lies between 0.2 and 0.3, I can expect the extent of bias to be quite negligible; if anything, the peer effect coefficient should be slightly greater than what is estimated.

## 7 ALTERNATIVE PEER REFERENCE GROUPS

### 7.1 GLOBAL NETWORK INTERACTIONS

In this section, I account for global network interactions. Recall that a global network is the entire graph of social interactions, both through direct connections and indirect connections. Multiple local networks comprised solely of direct connections are all nested within the local network. Until now I have restricted interactions to occur only through local networks. However, it is possible that a firm's peer group consist of not only direct connections but also indirect connections. To this extent, I construct a firm's peer group by linking into all the firms that it is directly or indirectly related to. In line with the network topology, I give direct connections the highest weight while calculating the average. To calculate weights in the global network I use a network statistic commonly known as the 'path distance'. The path distance is defined as the length of the shortest path between any two firms  $i$  and  $j$ . A path exists between firm  $i$  and  $j$  if they are connected either directly or through a sequence of other firms. For example, the path distance between two firms that are directly connected is one; path distance between two firms that are connected by an intermediary firm is two. The global network peer average is therefore just a weighted average of outcomes of all peers where the weights are given by the inverse of the path distance.

It is useful to understand how the instrument is applicable even in this context. In the previous section we had used average outcomes of the death induced deleted links in the previous time period to instrument for average peer outcomes in the current period. In this case we had only considered death induced deletion of links between two firms that are directly connected. In the global networks we can visualize multiple such instances wherein bilateral links are being broken due to death or retirement of shared directors. Consider three firms  $i$ ,  $j$  and  $k$ .  $i$  &  $j$  and  $j$  &  $k$  are directly connected. If  $j$  &  $k$  break a link due to death or retirement of a shared director then, in the global interactions case, even  $i$  is affected because the broken link results in reducing the *strength* of network connections for  $i$ . The advantage of this is that the instrument is still valid and we no longer have to rely on only bilateral link losses. The disadvantage is that the measure is prone to a lot of noise. While we know that firm  $j$  &  $k$  have lost a link, it is not necessary the strength of connection between  $i$  &  $k$  would reduce because it is possible that in the next period  $i$  directly links with  $k$ . The informativeness of this instrument then relies on the perturbations in connection patterns not

deviating significantly (apart from the death induced deletions) from the previous state.

Table (11) reports results on the global peer effects. While the coefficients on investment and executive compensation peer effects remain positive and statistically significant, they are much larger in magnitude compared to the local networks based specification. An increase of one standard deviation of the endogenous effects leads to an increase of 0.19 (as compared to 0.16 in the local networks case) standard deviations in the growth of market investment. Similarly, an increase of one standard deviation of the endogenous effects leads to an increase of 0.15 (as compared to 0.06 in the local networks case) standard deviations in the growth of executive compensation.

## 7.2 INDUSTRY PEER EFFECTS

I also account for peer interactions through a shared industry affiliation and contrast it with the network peer effect. Identification in this case is through partially overlapping groups using peers-of-peers as an exclusion, wherein some ‘peers of peers’ do not affect an individual directly but only through his or her own peers. I use the exogenous characteristics of an industry peers business group to identify endogenous peer effects. The exclusion restriction is valid since the business group’s peers (or peers-of-peers) are not directly connected to the target firm. Appendix A.3 details the identification strategy used to estimate industry based endogenous peer effects. Table 12 reports industry level peer effects. Note that all specifications include time fixed effects. I report results for market investment, executive compensation and current expenditure in R&D. I omit reporting results on other control variables for brevity. Column (1) shows OLS results, Column (2) IV results and Column (3) IV results with contextual effects. I do not report the first stage results, however I provide both the Cragg-Donald first stage F statistic and the joint significance of the excluded peer averages (instruments). I first discuss Panel A of Table 12 that reports results on corporate market investment. I find that both the OLS and the IV coefficients are positive and statistically significant although the IV coefficient is much larger in magnitude than the OLS. I find that a one standard deviation increase in the industry peer average investment is associated with a 0.27 standard deviation increase in growth in own investment. The significance of the coefficient disappears when I include contextual effects. Note that the first stage instruments are all jointly significant and are strongly correlated with the endogenous variable Panel B reports results on executive compensation. I find no statistically significant industry peer effects vis-à-vis compensation. Industry Peer effects in current R&D expenditure is reported in Panel C. In contrast to network peer effects, I find that industry R&D expenditure significantly increases the firm’s own growth of the same. A one standard deviation increase in the industry peer average R&D expenditure is associated with a 0.34 standard deviation increase in growth in own R&D expenditure and this effect is significant at 5%. Moreover, this effect holds even with the inclusion of contextual effects. The finding of positive industry peer effects for R&D but not for executive compensation is not surprising since there is substantial heterogeneity in performance and compensation policies amongst industry peer whereas R&D intensity is generally concentrated within certain industries.

To distinguish between the network and industry peer effects I include both the peer averages in a

parsimonious specification. Table (13) reports results for this specification<sup>37</sup>. The results show that network peers matter for market investment more than industry peers. In contrast, firms respond to the behaviour of industry peers in decisions on current R&D expenditure. The results hold even after controlling for industry by business group by time fixed effects.

## 8 CONCLUSION

This paper presents evidence on contemporaneous peer spillovers from firm social interactions. Using firm level panel data I examine whether peer effects operate on firm policies viz. investment, executive compensation and R&D expenditure. I find substantial evidence for positive network-based peer effects. My identification strategy exploits both the structure and the inter-temporal variation of firm networks to estimate endogenous peer effect, distinguishing it from other exogenous and correlated peer effects as well as from selection effects. I use information on director exits caused by death or retirement of shared directors to exploit the incidence of natural breaks in the network. Using average outcomes of those peers who have been lost due to death or retirement related director exits to instrument for a firm's average peer outcomes in the next time period I find that an increase of one standard deviation in network peer investment leads to an increase of 0.16 standard deviations in the growth of own firm investment. Similarly an increase of one standard deviation in network peer executive compensation leads to an increase of 0.05 standard deviations in the growth of own firm executive compensation. I find positive industry peer effects for market investment and R&D but not for executive compensation. I also compare industry peer effects with overall network peer effects and find that for market investment network peer effects dominates whereas the opposite is true for R&D investment. Further I show that these peer effects hold even when considering the 'global network' of any firm i.e. considering both direct links and indirect links to other firms. The results found in this paper have significance not only for the understanding of inter firm dynamics but also for designing optimal corporate governance regulations. Directors who sit across the boards of various companies can conduit information and influence firm strategy and policy in similar ways without requiring the firms to collude or form an alliance by more formal, market-based means.

As mentioned earlier, other studies that investigate peer effects in the firm context (but in the US context) also document evidence on positive peer spillovers influencing a range of corporate policy decisions. For instance, in the corporate network case, [Fracassi \(2008\)](#) finds that an increase in the strength of social connections shared by any two firms reduces the differences in their pattern of investment behaviour by 0.02 units i.e. it makes them their investment patterns more similar. On the other hand, for industry peer groups, [Leary and Roberts \(2010\)](#) find that one standard deviation change in industry based peer firms' leverage ratios is associated with an 11% change in own firm leverage ratios<sup>38</sup>.

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<sup>37</sup>I only report results on market investment and expenditure in current R&D because I find that the instruments set is not strongly correlated with the endogenous regressors of the other outcomes

<sup>38</sup>Interestingly my results are also similar in magnitude to studies that investigate peer interactions amongst students

In order to further understand the mechanisms driving the aggregate peer induced outcome increase, I also present evidence on network peer effects disaggregated by within network industry peers and non-industry peers. I find that for both market investment and executive compensation, industry network peer effects are close to zero while non-industry network peer effects are positive and significant. This implies that the bulk of the network peer effects derive from firm alliances that are inter-industry rather than intra-industry. It is likely that the nature of a firm's link to its industry peers tends to be more competitive relative to that of its non-industry peer links. This might suggest that information rather than mimicking is the mechanism underlying the peer driven influence. However these results are only suggestive of the quality and mechanisms of peer spillovers. More research, perhaps experimental, is needed to pin down the precise channels by which peer effects operate.

It is important to emphasize that while the focus of this paper has been to provide evidence on the existence of peer effects in different firm interaction settings, a full account of what determines corporate policies would need to take other factors into account. For example if firms are responding to some information received by their peers then a richer model will be needed to account for the filtering and updating mechanism that firms employ to take their decisions, using both their own and their peers' information signals. This is related to ambiguity in decision making since a firm will perceive substantial noise to be associated with signals received from all their peers. Such a model will also be able to distinguish between models of herding versus cascading by seeking to understand whether a firm ignores their own private signals in preference for their peers' or not. Detailed data that can provide dynamic information on the sequence of firms' investment in particular stocks would be needed to undertake such an exercise.

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and households. For students in general, studies have found that a one standard deviation increase in test scores of peers increases the student's own test score by around 0.1 to 0.3 standard deviations. Other studies on household retirement behaviour, crime, also find peer effects in a similar range. The extent of literature needed to be referred for this is quite large so I direct the reader to an excellent review on social interactions by various authors in the Handbook of Social Economics (Behabib, Bisin, and Jackson (eds.) 2011)

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## A APPENDIX

### A.1 EXCLUSION RESTRICTION

Endogenous network formation biases OLS estimates though the presence of selection specific unobservables. Recall that the elements  $w_{ij}^N$ , of the *endogenous* network adjacency matrix take the value one, if there is a link between firms  $i$  and  $j$ , and zero otherwise. Each binary element  $w_{ij}^N$  can be thought of as representing an underlying (latent) index function by which firm  $i$  derives a utility from linking with firm  $j$ . This utility can be influenced by many factors, both observable and unobservable. Let  $c_{ij}$  denote those factors that are unobservable to the econometrician and possibly correlated with individual errors  $u_i$ . This leads to biased estimates of the endogenous peer effect,  $E[(\mathbf{W}_t^N \mathbf{y}_t)' \mathbf{u}_t] \neq 0$ , because among other things, the elements of  $\mathbf{W}_t^N$  are correlated with  $\mathbf{u}_t$  through link formation specific unobservables,  $c_{ij,t}$ . To mitigate this concern I make use of random shocks – death or retirement of directors – to the observed network. As before,  $\mathbf{D}_{it-1}$  is a binary variable that indicates whether firm  $i$  experiences death or retirement of one or more directors in  $t - 1$ . Peers/links lost due to the shock are contained in the matrix  $\mathbf{W}^D$ , whose elements  $w_{ij,t-1}^D$  take the value one if firm  $i$  and  $j$  lose a shared director due to  $D_{it-1}, D_{jt-1} = 1$  and zero otherwise.

To prove that the exclusion restriction holds I use the fact that the endogenous network  $\mathbf{W}^N$  and the shock induced matrix  $\mathbf{W}^D$  are symmetric and that the errors are independent of the shock. Symmetry implies that  $(\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D)' = \mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D$ . Further, both  $\mathbf{W}^N$  and  $\mathbf{W}^D$  are row-normalized which means that the row sums are equal to one. Row-normalization also implies, following Geršgorin's theorem, that all eigenvalues of  $\mathbf{W}^N$  are less than or equal to one in absolute value. This ensures that  $|\beta| < 1$  which in turn implies that all eigenvalues of  $\beta \mathbf{W}^N$  are less than one in absolute value (Kelejian and Prucha 1998). This allows us to use a series expansion,  $(I - \beta \mathbf{W}^N)^{-1} = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta^k (\mathbf{W}^N)^k$  (Horn and Johnson 2005), that gives us the following result (omitting the first difference operators):

$$\begin{aligned}
 E[(\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D \mathbf{y}_{t-1})' \mathbf{u}_t] &= E[(\mathbf{y}_{t-1})' (\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D)' \mathbf{u}_t] & (12) \\
 &= E[(\mathbf{y}_{t-1})' ((\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D) \mathbf{u}_t)] \\
 &= E[((I - \beta \mathbf{W}_{t-1}^N)^{-1} (\gamma \mathbf{x}_{t-1} + \mathbf{u}_{t-1}))' ((\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D) \mathbf{u}_t)] \\
 &= E[\underbrace{(\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta^k (\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^N)^k \mathbf{u}_{t-1})'}_{\text{total sum of firm's own error and average errors of direct and indirect peers of degree } k \text{ in time } t-1} \underbrace{((\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D) \mathbf{u}_t)}_{\text{average errors of lost peers (who are no longer in firm's network in } t \text{) in time } t}]]
 \end{aligned}$$

The first term in the under-brace is the total sum of the firm's own error and the average errors of direct and indirect peers of degree  $k$  in time  $t - 1$ <sup>39</sup>. The second term is the average errors of lost peers (who are no longer in firm's network in  $t$ ) in time  $t$ . Note that *selection related* unobservables

<sup>39</sup>The expansion is given by:

$$E[\underbrace{(\mathbf{u}_{t-1})'}_{\text{firm's own error}} \underbrace{((\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D) \mathbf{u}_t)}_{\text{average errors of lost peers}}] + E[\underbrace{(\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^N \mathbf{u}_{t-1})'}_{\text{average errors of direct and indirect peers of degree } k \text{ in time } t-1} \underbrace{((\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D) \mathbf{u}_t)}_{\text{average errors of lost peers}}] + [ \underbrace{((\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^N)^2 \mathbf{u}_{t-1})'}_{\text{average errors of indirect peers of degree } k \text{ in time } t-1} \underbrace{((\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D) \mathbf{u}_t)}_{\text{average errors of lost peers}}] + \dots$$



contained in the first term are orthogonal to the network shock and therefore to the network shock induced average errors of lost peers. Then, conditional on industry and business group by time fixed effects and under the assumption that the non-systematic component of the errors ( $\varepsilon_{\eta t}^{I/G}$  in Eq. (10)) are serially uncorrelated across the network, it can be seen that Eq. (12) is equal to zero. Hanushek et al. (2003) show how the use of time specific fixed effects can mitigate the problem of serial correlation when using lagged peer averages. The use of this instrument places slightly strong assumptions on the structure of the error terms. Therefore, to further alleviate the concern of network related serial correlation, I use two alternative instruments (separately): average of *lagged* peer outcomes ( $\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D \mathbf{y}_{t-2}$ ) and average *current* exogenous characteristics ( $\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D \mathbf{x}_t$ )<sup>40</sup>. Both these variables are strong proxies for the original instrument, ( $\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D \mathbf{y}_{t-1}$ ) and can accommodate network and time related autocorrelation. The results are robust to the use of these alternative instruments.

## A.2 MONTE CARLO SET UP

This section outlines the simulation procedure. I first simulate random networks with controlled network topologies. Consider the following population network,  $\mathbf{W}^P$  with sub-subscripts  $l$  and  $z$  denoting listed and non-listed firms respectively:

$$\mathbf{W}^P = \left[ \begin{array}{ccc|ccc} a_{1_l 1_l} & \cdots & a_{1_l n_l} & b_{1_l 1_z} & \cdots & b_{1_l n_z} \\ \vdots & (\mathbf{W}^L) & \vdots & \vdots & (\mathbf{W}^M) & \vdots \\ a_{n_l 1_l} & \cdots & a_{n_l n_l} & b_{n_l 1_z} & \cdots & b_{n_l n_z} \\ \hline b_{1_z n_l} & \cdots & b_{n_z 1_l} & c_{1_z 1_z} & \cdots & c_{1_z n_z} \\ \vdots & (\mathbf{W}^M)' & \vdots & \vdots & (\mathbf{W}^Z) & \vdots \\ b_{1_z n_l} & \cdots & b_{1_z 1_l} & c_{n_z 1_z} & \cdots & c_{n_z n_z} \end{array} \right]$$

The matrix can be partitioned into four distinct block matrices with three different types of links. The first type of link concerns links between listed companies, ‘listed links’ (contained in matrix  $\mathbf{W}^L$ ); the second types of links are those between a listed company and non-listed company (contained in matrix  $\mathbf{W}^M$ ); the third types of links are between a pair of non-listed companies, ‘non-listed links’ (contained in matrix  $\mathbf{W}^Z$ ). The objective is to assess the performance of estimators when sampling only matrix  $\mathbf{W}^L$  that contains listed links (elements  $a_{.,.}$ ) from the population matrix  $\mathbf{W}^P$ . The simulation exercise generates several population networks each with different topologies. The two topological parameters that I control are, listed link density (henceforth listed-density), sample size and homophily. For example in the first experiment, I compare estimators between two population networks; one where the proportion of listed links (to the total number of links) is 0.3 and one where the proportion of listed links is 0.8. Overall, I vary the proportion of listed links over a range of 0.3 to 0.85 with increments of 0.05. For this application, I generate networks with  $n = 500$  companies and also vary the number of listed companies amongst the 500; the size of the listed companies is varied over the range 25 to 150 in 25 step increments. Therefore for the first experiment, I have

<sup>40</sup>This instrument set is separate from the instrument set used for identifying contextual effects, which is the average *lagged* exogenous characteristics of lost peers ( $\mathbf{W}_{t-1}^D \mathbf{x}_{t-1}$ ). The contextual effects are therefore still identified.

a total of 114 unique networks with controlled topologies. Data for the experiment are generated using the following autoregressive model<sup>41</sup>:

$$\mathbf{y}_n = \beta \mathbf{W}_n \mathbf{y}_n + \gamma_0 \mathbf{1}_n + \gamma_1 \mathbf{x}_n + u_n \quad (13)$$

$\mathbf{W}_n$  is a  $n \times n$  weights matrix,  $\mathbf{1}_n$  is an  $n$ -dimensional column vector of ones's,  $x_{n,i}$  is independently generated from a uniform distribution over the range  $[0, 10]$  for  $i = 1, \dots, n$  and  $u_{i,n}$  are i.i.d  $N(0, \sigma^2 = 0.5)$ . The intercept term and the coefficient on the independent variable are set to 2.0 and 1.0, respectively.  $y_n$  is obtained using the reduced form of Eq. (13):

$$\mathbf{y}_n = (\mathbf{I} - \beta \mathbf{W}_n)^{-1} (\gamma_0 \mathbf{1}_n + \gamma_1 \mathbf{x}_n + u_n) \quad (14)$$

A total of 200 draws are obtained for the error terms and independent variable  $\mathbf{x}$ . Next, I draw a sample of all the listed companies in the population and extract the sample network which is a subset of the true population network ( $W$ ) and captures only links amongst the listed companies. I use a generalized two stage least squares estimator as proposed in [Kelejian and Prucha \(1998\)](#). In order to assess the quality of the estimators in the simulations, I calculate the root mean squared error (RMSE) which is the square-root of the mean square error. The MSE for the parameter  $\beta$  is calculated is given by [\(Florax and Rey 1995\)](#):

$$MSE(\beta) = \sum_r \frac{(\hat{\beta}_r - \bar{\hat{\beta}})^2}{R} + \left[ \frac{\sum_r (\beta_s - \hat{\beta}_r)}{R} \right]^2 \quad (15)$$

where  $\hat{\beta}_r$  is the estimate in replication  $r$ ,  $\bar{\hat{\beta}}$  is the mean of the estimate for all replications,  $\beta_s$  is the true value of the parameter, and  $R$  is the number of replications in the simulation experiment. The MSE combines both, the estimation variance as well as the bias of an estimate into a measure of goodness of fit.

In the second experiment, I follow the same procedure outlined above but vary each simulated network by an additional homophily parameter. This means that in addition to varying the proportion of listed links to the total number of links, I also control the relative distribution of listed links to mixed links in the population. I vary the degree of homophily over a range of 0.1 to 0.70 with increments of 0.20.

### A.3 IDENTIFICATION OF INDUSTRY PEER EFFECTS

To identify peer effects specific to a firms' industry group, I construct the peer group of each firm as the set of all other firms who share the same NIC code or belong to the same business group. Even

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<sup>41</sup>I simulate the model with one exogenous variable and a constant for a single period for ease of exposition. However the results hold for a time dependent spatial autoregressive model as well, albeit with some further assumptions about the structure of errors and nature of serial correlations. For the simulated model I also assume that the weights matrix is exogenous in order to feasibly compare the true population parameter with the estimated one. The construction of the instrument although dependent on the weights matrix is invariant to the choice of the sample since the occurrence of death or retirement related breaks is orthogonal to the boundary imposed on the network.

in this case, the resulting peer interaction structure is non-linear in nature because each firm's set of industry plus business group peers are distinct. Firm  $i$  can be affiliated with all other firms in its industry but it is also affiliated to another set of firms that belong to its business group who may or may not be in the same industry. To see this, denote  $\mathbf{W}^I$  as the industry based peer interaction matrix with  $w_{ij}^I = 1/n_{ij}$  if firm  $i$  shares the same NIC code or belongs to the same business group as firm  $j$  and zero otherwise. This implies that matrix  $\mathbf{W}^I$  has block diagonal elements of varying sizes. This brings about variation in reduced-form coefficients across industry groups of different size that ensures identification. The coefficient on the endogenous peer effect will be biased if firms' own policy decision influences their peers' decision or if there are common time varying group specific shocks that affect both the firm and the peer's behaviour. In order to find a causal effect, one would need an exclusion restriction that shifts the outcome of the firm independently of its peers. Therefore we need a valid exclusion restriction such that it affects the average behaviors of a firm's peer group but not the firm's behaviour directly.

Here the exclusion restrictions are derived from the peer interaction structure itself, specifically, the overlapping nature of affiliation. I exploit the overlap between a firm's industry based peer group (henceforth industry group) and its ownership based peer group (henceforth business group) to instrument for the endogenous peer effect. This identification strategy using peers-of-peers as an exclusion, wherein some 'peers of peers' do not affect an individual directly but only through his or her own peers, has been recently used by many authors. [Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin \(2009\)](#) provide a general framework to show that endogenous and exogenous effects can be distinguished through overlapping sub-groups within a specific network structure<sup>42</sup>. In this setting, when firm  $i$  and  $j$  belong to the same industry group, the exclusion corresponds to assuming that a firm  $i$  is not directly affected by firm  $j$ 's business group peers. I ensure that the characteristics of only those business group firms are used that share no affiliations (industry or business) with the target firm  $i$ . Firms that belong to  $j$ 's business group and are not associated with firm  $i$  form our excluded group, and the instruments are generated from their exogenous characteristics. As before, to mitigate the bias associated with selection into the industry, I employ a first differenced specification that eliminates firm specific unobservables that are constant over time. Using the row vector,  $\mathbf{W}_i^I$  I obtain the following specification:

$$\Delta y_{it} = \alpha \mathbf{W}_i^I \Delta \mathbf{y}_t + \lambda \Delta x_{it} + \varphi \mathbf{W}_i^I \Delta \mathbf{x}_t + \Delta \chi_t + \Delta v_{it} \quad (16)$$


The set of excluded peers is contained in the matrix  $(\mathbf{W}^I)^2$  and their exogenous characteristics are used as instruments for  $\mathbf{W}^I \mathbf{y}$ . For convenience we denote the instrument set as  $(\mathbf{W}^{\text{EX}} \mathbf{x}_t)$  where  $\mathbf{W}^{\text{EX}} = (\mathbf{W}^I)^2$  refers to the network of excluded group (EG) or 'peers of peers'. Note that in this case the peer reference group does not change over time so the variation in peers' outcomes comes only from the changes in outcomes of a constant set of peers. As before, Eq. (16) is estimated by

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<sup>42</sup>Lin (2007) and Lee (2008) extend this model to a spatial autoregressive (SAR) framework where peer effects are captured by the spatial lag term. [De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli \(2010\)](#) also show that in a context where peer groups do not overlap fully, it is possible to identify all the relevant parameters of the standard linear-in-means model of social interactions. See also [Laschever \(2009\)](#).


two stage least squares. The exclusion is informative because there is ample evidence that business groups are responsive to each other's shocks as well as profits (Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002); Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru (2007)).

Figure 1: Local Network Shocks




**Note:** The graph shows a time series plot of network peer average investment for an example firm. This firm experiences a local network shock – the death or retirement of directors that break network links – at **two** given points of time (indicated by the dark circles). The fall in average network investment due to these network shocks is greater in 2001-2002 as compared to 2004-2005. It is easy to see that this is because the average outcomes of lost peers ( $W^D y$ ) is much higher in 2001 (5.45) as compared to 2004 (1.95).

Figure 2: Network Topology Summary




**Note:** The graph plots time series trends of the following network measures: *Density* - Proportion of links relative to total number possible; *Degree* - Total # links of any firm (averaged over all firms); *Clustering* - A measure of transitivity in link association i.e. whether two links of any firm are themselves directly linked; *AvgPath* - Distance between any two firms in the network (averaged over all firms).

Figure 3: Network Dynamics




**Note:** The graph plots time series trends of network dynamics in a bipartite graph (following measures are averaged over all firms): *Appointments* - Total # of new directors appointed for any firm ; *Cessations* - Total # of director exits for any firm; *Newlink* - Total # of links added due to director appointments; *Lostlink* - Total # of links lost due to director exits; *Death\_Retire* - Total # of links lost due to director exits from death or retirement.

Figure 4: Network Peer Investment and Firm Investment




**Note:** The graph is a non-parametric plot (lowess) of own firm market investment in relation to its network peers' market investment.

Figure 5: Network Peer Exec. Compensation and Firm Exec. Compensation



**Note:** The graph is a non-parametric plot (lowess) of own firm executive compensation in relation to its network peers' executive compensation.


Figure 6: Simulated Expected Values under Different Regulation Scenarios



**Note:** The figure plots the histogram of simulated expected values and compares it to the observed mean. The mean expected value (simulated) is given by dashed line while the observed mean is given by the solid line. The figures on the left in the top and bottom panel show the distribution of simulated expected values when *all* interlocks are prohibited; the figures on the right show the distribution of simulated expected values when only *within industry* interlocks are prohibited.




Figure 7: RMSE for Network Simulations: Experiment 1,  $\beta = 0.2$



**Note:** Each cell of the graph plots the RMSE associated with all given levels of Listed-density (Proportion of listed links to total number of links in the network) and Size (proportion of listed firms in the population).

Figure 8: RMSE for Network Simulations: Experiment 2,  $\beta = 0.2$ , Size=20%



**Note:** The three dimensional surface plot maps the distribution of the RMSE over two network topology parameters - Listed-density and Homophily (proportion of listed links relative to mixed links) for a sample size of 20% and a peer effect parameter of 0.2.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Median	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
Market Investments	32166	1.35	1.89	0.48	2.06
Executive Compensation	32166	0.24	0.8	0.1	0.28
Capital Expenditure	32166	0.08	0.27	0	0
Current R&D Expnd.	32166	0.14	0.54	0	0
Sales (log)	32166	3.11	2.39	3.22	4.93
PBDITA	32166	107.14	953.33	2.89	20.91
Assets (log)	32166	3.97	2.03	3.76	5.26
Network Size	32166	6.4	10.23	3	8
# Links Lost (Death)	32166	0.29	0.95	0	0
<b>Network Averages</b>					
W <sup>N</sup> Market Investments	32166	1.5	1.5	1.23	2.44
W <sup>N</sup> Executive Compensation	32166	0.26	0.31	0.18	0.39
W <sup>N</sup> Capital Expenditure	32166	0.1	0.18	0	0.18
W <sup>N</sup> Current R&D Expnd.	32166	0.2	0.39	0	0.28
<b>Industry Averages</b>					
W <sup>I</sup> Market Investments	32166	1.48	1.25	1.22	1.88
W <sup>I</sup> Executive Compensation	32166	0.25	0.34	0.18	0.33
W <sup>I</sup> Capital Expenditure	32166	0.09	0.15	0.01	0.13
W <sup>I</sup> Current R&D Expnd.	32166	0.15	0.29	0.02	0.17
<b>Instruments</b>					
<i>Local Network Shocks (Reduction from death induced link loss)</i>					
W <sup>D</sup> Market Investments	32166	0.24	0.94	0	0
W <sup>D</sup> Executive Compensation	32166	0.04	0.17	0	0
W <sup>D</sup> Capital Expenditure	32166	0.01	0.1	0	0
W <sup>D</sup> Current R&D Expnd.	32166	0.02	0.21	0	0
<i>Excluded Peer Averages</i>					
W <sup>EX</sup> Assets (log)	32166	5.03	1.39	4.98	5.83
W <sup>EX</sup> Sales (log)	32166	3.92	1.47	4.21	4.88
W <sup>EX</sup> PBDITA	32166	329.61	634.29	69.53	328.99

Table 2: Network Peer Effects: Corporate Market Investment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Mkt. Invst.	$W^N$ Mkt. Invst.	Mkt. Invst.	Mkt. Invst.	Mkt. Invst.	Mkt. Invst.
$W^N$ Mkt. Invst.	0.020** (0.005)		0.172* (0.068)	0.149+ (0.079)	0.232** (0.088)	0.221* (0.094)
$W^D$ Mkt. Invst.		-0.064** (0.006)				
PBDITA	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
Assets (logs)	0.105** (0.015)	0.062** (0.021)	0.096** (0.016)	0.132** (0.020)	0.101** (0.017)	0.096** (0.018)
Sales (logs)	0.040** (0.010)	0.006 (0.015)	0.039** (0.011)	0.035** (0.012)	0.039** (0.011)	0.040** (0.012)
# Director Exits	0.003 (0.004)	-0.010+ (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)	0.008+ (0.005)
Growth Trajectory <sup>‡</sup>				-0.051** (0.006)		
$W^N$ PBDITA					-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
$W^N$ Assets (logs)					-0.054 (0.101)	0.050 (0.121)
$W^N$ Sales (logs)					0.064 (0.108)	0.084 (0.116)
Network Size						-0.017 (0.011)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	19644	19644	19644	15271	19644	19644
Cragg-Donald F			124.813	125.616	8.873	5.81

## Notes:

1.  $W^N$  represents local network peer averages.;  $W^D$  represents averages of past period links that have been broken due to death or retirement of shared directors
2. PBDITA is the total Profit Before Depreciation, Interest, Tax and Amortisation; Assets in logs is total book value of assets; # Director Exits refers to the number of directors who have left the company in the previous time period; Network Size measures the number of direct links i.e. the number of other firms with whom it shares common directors.
3. All control variables are lagged by one year.
4. <sup>‡</sup> defined as the difference in outcome variable between period  $t - 1$  and  $t - 2$ .
5. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation and arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the network level.
6. + indicates significance at 10%; \* at 5%; \*\* at 1%.

Table 3: Network Peer Effects: Executive Compensation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Ex. Comp.	$W^N$ Ex. Comp.	Ex. Comp.	Ex. Comp.	Ex. Comp.	Ex. Comp.
$W^N$ Ex. Comp.	0.053** (0.007)		0.131+ (0.075)	0.154+ (0.081)	0.167+ (0.101)	0.168+ (0.099)
$W^D$ Ex. Comp.		-0.089** (0.007)				
PBDITA	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Assets (logs)	0.069** (0.004)	0.020** (0.005)	0.068** (0.005)	0.060** (0.006)	0.069** (0.005)	0.070** (0.005)
Sales (logs)	0.005+ (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.006+ (0.003)	0.012** (0.004)	0.006+ (0.003)	0.005+ (0.003)
# Director Exits	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Growth Trajectory <sup>‡</sup>				-0.003+ (0.002)		
$W^N$ PBDITA					-0.000+ (0.000)	-0.000+ (0.000)
$W^N$ Assets (logs)					0.016 (0.026)	0.001 (0.028)
$W^N$ Sales (logs)					0.003 (0.030)	-0.001 (0.030)
Network Size						0.003 (0.003)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	19644	19644	19644	15271	19644	19644
Cragg-Donald F			178.946	179.066	8.88	5.61

Notes:

1.  $W^N$  represents local network peer averages.;  $W^D$  represents averages of past period links that have been broken due to death or retirement of shared directors
2. PBDITA is the total Profit Before Depreciation, Interest, Tax and Amortisation; Assets in logs is total book value of assets; # Director Exits refers to the number of directors who have left the company in the previous time period; Network Size measures the number of direct links i.e. the number of other firms with whom it shares common directors.
3. All control variables are lagged by one year.
4. <sup>‡</sup> defined as the difference in outcome variable between period  $t - 1$  and  $t - 2$ .
5. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation and arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the network level.
6. + indicates significance at 10%; \* at 5%; \*\* at 1%.

Table 4: Network Peer Effects: Capital Expenditure

	(1) Capex	(2) W <sup>N</sup> Capex	(3) Capex	(4) Capex	(5) Capex	(6) Capex
W <sup>N</sup> Capex	0.004 (0.011)		0.225 (0.151)	0.105 (0.167)	0.328 <sup>+</sup> (0.171)	0.317 <sup>+</sup> (0.172)
W <sup>D</sup> Capex		-0.084** (0.008)				
PBDITA	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Assets (logs)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)
Sales (logs)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
# Director Exits	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.003 <sup>+</sup> (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Growth Trajectory <sup>‡</sup>				-0.083** (0.006)		
W <sup>N</sup> PBDITA					-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
W <sup>N</sup> Assets (logs)					-0.094** (0.032)	-0.073* (0.036)
W <sup>N</sup> Sales (logs)					0.084* (0.038)	0.089* (0.039)
Network Size						-0.004 (0.004)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	19644	19644	19644	15271	19644	19644
Cragg-Donald F			117.738	117.601	9.775	6.002

*Notes:*

1. W<sup>N</sup> represents local network peer averages.; W<sup>D</sup> represents averages of past period links that have been broken due to death or retirement of shared directors
2. PBDITA is the total Profit Before Depreciation, Interest, Tax and Amortisation; Assets in logs is total book value of assets; # Director Exits refers to the number of directors who have left the company in the previous time period; Network Size measures the number of direct links i.e. the number of other firms with whom it shares common directors.
3. All control variables are lagged by one year.
4. <sup>‡</sup> defined as the difference in outcome variable between period  $t - 1$  and  $t - 2$ .
5. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation and arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the network level.
6. <sup>+</sup> indicates significance at 10%; \* at 5%; \*\* at 1%.

Table 5: Network Peer Effects: Current Expenditure in R&D

	(1) R&D	(2) $W^N$ R&D	(3) R&D	(4) R&D	(5) R&D	(6) R&D
$W^N$ R&D	0.007 (0.006)		-0.036 (0.079)	-0.013 (0.080)	0.059 (0.089)	0.016 (0.094)
$W^D$ R&D		-0.071** (0.007)				
PBDITA	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
Assets (logs)	0.020** (0.005)	0.003 (0.006)	0.020** (0.005)	0.022** (0.006)	0.023** (0.005)	0.019** (0.006)
Sales (logs)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.008* (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)
# Director Exits	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Growth Trajectory <sup>‡</sup>				-0.084** (0.006)		
$W^N$ PBDITA					-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
$W^N$ Assets (logs)					0.003 (0.027)	0.065* (0.032)
$W^N$ Sales (logs)					-0.027 (0.032)	-0.010 (0.035)
Network Size						-0.011** (0.003)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	19644	19644	19644	15271	19644	19644
Cragg-Donald F			122.915	123.20	8.80	5.77

Notes:

1.  $W^N$  represents local network peer averages.;  $W^D$  represents averages of past period links that have been broken due to death or retirement of shared directors
2. PBDITA is the total Profit Before Depreciation, Interest, Tax and Amortisation; Assets in logs is total book value of assets; # Director Exits refers to the number of directors who have left the company in the previous time period; Network Size measures the number of direct links i.e. the number of other firms with whom it shares common directors.
3. All control variables are lagged by one year.
4. <sup>‡</sup> defined as the difference in outcome variable between period  $t - 1$  and  $t - 2$ .
5. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation and arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the network level.
6. + indicates significance at 10%; \* at 5%; \*\* at 1%.

Table 6: Network Peer Effects: Fixed Effects

## A. Industry-Group Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mkt. Invst.	Ex. Comp.	Capex	R&D
$W^N$ Mkt. Invst.	0.164* (0.066)			
$W^N$ Ex. Comp.		0.167* (0.070)		
$W^N$ Capex			0.235 (0.144)	
$W^N$ R&D				-0.022 (0.074)
PBDITA	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Sales (log)	0.028* (0.011)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)
Assets (log)	0.008 (0.017)	0.049** (0.005)	-0.012+ (0.006)	0.009+ (0.005)
# Director Exits	0.006 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Group Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	19644	19644	19644	19644
Cragg-Donald F	118.865	188.356	110.894	123.75

## B. Industry-Group-Time Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mkt. Invst.	Ex. Comp.	Capex	R&D
$W^N$ Mkt. Invst.	0.139* (0.068)			
$W^N$ Ex. Comp.		0.190** (0.073)		
$W^N$ Capex			0.241+ (0.146)	
$W^N$ R&D				-0.168+ (0.099)
PBDITA	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Sales (log)	0.021 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)
Assets (log)	-0.030 (0.020)	0.053** (0.006)	-0.010 (0.007)	0.005 (0.006)
# Director Exits	0.011* (0.004)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)
Industry-Group-Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	19644	19644	19644	19644
Cragg-Donald F	96.45	156.94	97.05	68.32

## Notes:

- $W^N$  represents local network peer averages.
- PBDITA is the total Profit Before Depreciation, Interest, Tax and Amortisation; Assets in logs is total book value of assets; # Director Exits refers to the number of directors who have left the company in the previous time period.
- All control variables are lagged by one year.
- Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation and arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the network level; + indicates significance at 10%; \* at 5%; \*\* at 1%.

Table 7: Network Peer Effects: Heterogeneous Effects

	Mkt. Invst.			Ex. Comp.		
	I: $W^{NI}$	I: $W^{NN}$	II: Mkt. Invst.	I: $W^{NI}$	I: $W^{NN}$	II: Ex. Comp.
$W^{NI}$ Mkt. Invst.			-0.048 (0.158)			
$W^{NN}$ Mkt. Invst.			0.131* (0.065)			
$W^{NI}$ Ex. Comp.						-0.117 (0.195)
$W^{NN}$ Ex. Comp.						0.182* (0.071)
$W^{DI}$ Mkt. Invst.	-0.092** (0.013)	-0.010 (0.022)				
$W^{DN}$ Mkt. Invst.	0.004 (0.005)	-0.076** (0.008)				
$W^{DI}$ Ex. Comp.				-0.350** (0.045)	0.005 (0.075)	
$W^{DN}$ Ex. Comp.				0.007 (0.005)	-0.115** (0.009)	
PBDITA	-0.000** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Sales (log)	0.004 (0.012)	0.015 (0.020)	0.021 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Assets (log)	-0.022 (0.018)	0.063* (0.030)	-0.031 (0.020)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.017** (0.006)	0.053** (0.006)
# Director Exits	-0.016** (0.004)	-0.015* (0.006)	0.010 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Fixed Effects (Industry-Group-Time)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	19644	19644	19644	19644	19644	19644
Joint Cragg-Donald F			23.227			30.324

*Notes:*

1. *I* refers to First stage of two stage least squares procedure while *II* refers to the second stage.
2.  $W^{NI}$  represents local network averages of same industry peers;  $W^{NN}$  represents local network averages of non-industry peers;  $W^{DI}$  represents averages of past period same industry links that have been broken due to death or retirement of shared directors;  $W^{DN}$  represents averages of past period non-industry links that have been broken due to death or retirement of shared directors
3. PBDITA is the total Profit Before Depreciation, Interest, Tax and Amortisation; Assets in logs is total book value of assets; # Director Exits refers to the number of directors who have left the company in the previous time period; Network Size measures the number of direct links i.e. the number of other firms with whom it shares common directors.
4. All control variables are lagged by one year.
5. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation and arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the network level.
6. <sup>+</sup> indicates significance at 10%; \* at 5%; \*\* at 1%.



Table 8: Investment in Same Stocks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	Rare Event Adj.	OLS FE	IV: First	IV RE	IV FE
<b>Network Strength</b>	<b>0.091**</b> <b>(0.001)</b>	<b>1.655**</b> <b>(0.011)</b>	<b>0.017**</b> <b>(0.001)</b>		<b>0.638**</b> <b>(0.245)</b>	<b>1.187**</b> <b>(0.401)</b>
Shared Director Exit <sup>†</sup>				-0.005** (0.000)		
Diff PBDITA <sup>‡</sup>	0.322** (0.0002)	4.16** (0.003)	0.132** (0.0006)	0.350** (0.0001)	0.074 (0.086)	-0.137** (0.016)
Diff Assets (logs)	0.001** (0.000)	0.053** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.004** (0.000)	0.003** (0.0009)	-0.001 (0.001)
Diff Sales (logs)	-0.0004** (0.0000)	-0.011** (0.0009)	-0.001** (0.0009)	0.0006** (0.0078)	-0.0005** (0.0000)	-0.001** (0.0003)
Same Industry	0.044** (0.000)	0.867** (0.009)		-0.004** (0.0685)	0.049** (0.001)	
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Pair Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
<i>N</i>	11798464	11798464	11798464	5759498	5759498	5759498
Cragg-Donald F					123.21	98.806

*Notes:*

1. The units of analysis in all specifications are dyads, i.e. a pair of two companies  $i$  and  $j$ . Standard errors are adjusted using the QAP procedure to account for pair-wise dependence. The dependent variable is binary taking the value 1 both  $i$  and  $j$  have invested in the same stock in time period  $t$ . *Network Strength* indicates the value of connection between  $i$  and  $j$  and ranges from zero to one. It is equal to the inverse of path distance in the global network between  $i$  and  $j$  – zero indicates no connection and one indicates direct connection. All other values mean that  $i, j$  are connected but through a series of intermediate links. Differences are in absolute terms due to the symmetric nature of the dyads.

2. <sup>‡</sup> coefficient multiplied by  $10^6$ .

3. Column (2) adjusts coefficient estimates and standard errors to account for large non-events (zeroes) using the procedure outline in King and Zeng (2001). It is a logistic regression so the coefficient estimate can be interpreted as follows: A change in network strength from 0 to 1 (no connection to direct connection) increases the probability of investing in the same stock by 11%. The relative risk associated with this change (of 0 to 1) is 4.56 log-odds.

4. <sup>†</sup> is a dummy taking the value 1 if there are any common directors over the network between  $i$  and  $j$  who have died or retired in the previous time period. For this reason The IV regressions (Columns (3) - Column (6)) discard observations from the first year (2006) as its lag is not defined/missing.

5. Time fixed effects are not included when using pair fixed effects so as to preserve some variation in the dependent variable

6. <sup>+</sup> indicates significance at 10%; \* at 5%; \*\* at 1%.

Table 9: Sensitivity Results: Direct Effect of Network Shocks

	(1) Mkt. Invst.	(2) Ex. Comp.
Firm Shock	0.006 (0.008)	0.0007 (0.002)
Network Shock	0.010 (0.0142)	-0.004 (0.004)
Peer Variables	Yes	Yes
Firm Controls	Yes	Yes
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	27084	21727

*Notes:*

1. *Firm Shock* is a binary variable that indicates director exits exclusive of death/retirement of shared directors; *Network Shock* is a binary variable that indicates director exits due to death/retirement of shared directors.
2. The specification controls for endogenous and exogenous peer group averages, lagged firm controls (profits, assets, sales) and network size.
3. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation and arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the network level.
5. <sup>+</sup> indicates significance at 10%; \* at 5%; \*\* at 1%.

Table 10: Sensitivity Results: Probability of New Link

	(1) New Link	(2) New Link
Link Loss (Death)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.009)
Firm Controls	No	Yes
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	27084	21727
Joint Significance of Time FE	645.14 (0.00)	540.80 (0.00)

*Notes:*

1. *Link Loss* is a binary variable that indicates whether a firm experiences the death/retirement of a shared director that causes a network link to break exogenously.
2. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation and arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the network level.
5. <sup>+</sup> indicates significance at 10%; \* at 5%; \*\* at 1%.

Table 11: Network Peer Effects: Global Network

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mkt. Invst.	Ex. Comp.	Capex	R&D
$W^G$ Mkt. Invst.	0.442* (0.191)			
$W^G$ Ex. Comp.		0.632+ (0.394)		
$W^G$ Capex			1.153 (1.023)	
$W^G$ R&D				-0.341 (0.503)
PBDITA	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
Assets (log)	0.090** (0.018)	0.065** (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.022** (0.006)
Sales (log)	0.042** (0.011)	0.006+ (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)
# Director Exits	0.008+ (0.005)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	19644	19644	19644	19644
Cragg-Donald F	45.464	23.457	20.018	26.973

*Notes:*

1.  $W^G$  represents *global* network peer averages
2. PBDITA is the total Profit Before Depreciation, Interest, Tax and Amortisation; Assets in logs is total book value of assets; # Director Exits refers to the number of directors who have left the company in the previous time period; Network Size measures the number of direct links i.e. the number of other firms with whom it shares common directors.
3. All control variables are lagged by one year.
4. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation and arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the network level.
5. + indicates significance at 10%; \* at 5%; \*\* at 1%.

Table 12: Industry Peer Effects

**A. Mkt. Invst.**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Mkt. Invst.	Mkt. Invst.	Mkt. Invst.
W <sup>I</sup> Mkt. Invst.	0.043** (0.010)	0.487+ (0.272)	0.456 (0.303)
W <sup>I</sup> PBDITA			-0.000 (0.000)
W <sup>I</sup> Sales (log)			-0.006 (0.025)
W <sup>I</sup> Assets (log)			0.116** (0.044)
<i>N</i>	21727	17280	17280
Excl. Instruments Joint Significance		40.80 (0.00)	32.80 (0.00)
Cragg-Donald F		14.046	8.324

**B. Executive Compensation**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Ex. Comp.	Ex. Comp.	Ex. Comp.
W <sup>I</sup> Ex. Comp.	0.032** (0.005)	0.224 (0.317)	1.015 (2.583)
W <sup>I</sup> PBDITA			0.000 (0.000)
W <sup>I</sup> Sales (log)			0.020 (0.071)
W <sup>I</sup> Assets (log)			0.056 (0.152)
<i>N</i>	21727	17280	17280
Excl. Instruments Joint Significance		6.58 (0.01)	0.24 (0.623)
Cragg-Donald F		6.536	1.23

**C. R& D**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	R&D	R&D	R&D
W <sup>I</sup> R&D	0.049** (0.012)	0.690* (0.302)	0.976* (0.448)
W <sup>I</sup> PBDITA			0.000 (0.000)
W <sup>I</sup> Sales (log)			0.002 (0.014)
W <sup>I</sup> Assets (log)			0.027** (0.010)
<i>N</i>	21727	17280	17280
Excl. Instruments Joint Significance		38.91 (0.00)	15.09 (0.00)
Cragg-Donald F		14.31	5.43

Notes: 1. W<sup>I</sup> represents industry peer averages.

2. PBDITA is the total Profit Before Depreciation, Interest, Tax and Amortisation; Assets in logs is total book value of assets; # Director Exits refers to the number of directors who have left the company in the previous time period; Network Size measures the number of direct links i.e. the number of other firms with whom it shares common directors.

3. All control variables are lagged by one year.

4. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation and arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the network level.

5. + indicates significance at 10%; \* at 5%; \*\* at 1%.

Table 13: Industry-Network Peer Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mkt. Invst.	Mkt. Invst.	R&D	R&D
$W^N$ Mkt. Invst.	0.193* (0.086)	0.146 <sup>+</sup> (0.080)		
$W^I$ Mkt. Invst.	0.237 (0.281)	0.016 (0.257)		
$W^N$ R&D			-0.060 (0.114)	-0.016 (0.127)
$W^I$ R&D			0.690* (0.318)	0.629** (0.184)
PBDITA	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Assets (log)	0.089** (0.019)	-0.026 (0.022)	0.023** (0.006)	0.004 (0.007)
Sales (log)	0.035** (0.012)	0.016 (0.014)	0.003 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)
# Director exits	0.007 (0.005)	0.012* (0.004)	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)
Time F.E.	Yes		Yes	
Industry-Group-Time F.E.		Yes		Yes
<i>N</i>	15630	14172	15630	14172
Cragg-Donald F	10.688	14.414	10.482	13.204

*Notes:*

1.  $W^N$  represents local network peer averages;  $W^I$  represents industry peer averages.

2. PBDITA is the total Profit Before Depreciation, Interest, Tax and Amortisation; Assets in logs is total book value of assets; # Director Exits refers to the number of directors who have left the company in the previous time period; Network Size measures the number of direct links i.e. the number of other firms with whom it shares common directors.

3. All control variables are lagged by one year.

4. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation and arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the network level.

5. <sup>+</sup> indicates significance at 10%; \* at 5%; \*\* at 1%.

Table 14: Monte Carlo Results: Experiment 1

Size	Density	$\beta = 0$		$\beta = 0.1$		$\beta = 0.2$		$\beta = 0.3$		$\beta = 0.4$		$\beta = 0.5$	
		Mean	RMSE	Mean	RMSE	Mean	RMSE	Mean	RMSE	Mean	RMSE	Mean	RMSE
0.1	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.08	0.04	0.16	0.06	0.24	0.08	0.32	0.10	0.40
	0.1	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.11	0.09	0.17	0.13	0.23	0.17	0.29	0.21
	0.25	0.00	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.19	0.03	0.29	0.03	0.39	0.03	0.49	0.02
	0.5	0.00	0.04	0.11	0.04	0.20	0.04	0.30	0.03	0.40	0.03	0.50	0.02
	0.75	0.00	0.04	0.10	0.04	0.20	0.03	0.30	0.03	0.40	0.03	0.50	0.02
0.2	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.10	0.04	0.20	0.03	0.30	0.03	0.40	0.03	0.50	0.02
	0.1	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.07	0.06	0.14	0.08	0.22	0.12	0.28	0.14	0.36
	0.25	0.00	0.01	0.06	0.04	0.12	0.08	0.19	0.12	0.25	0.15	0.32	0.18
	0.5	0.00	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.19	0.02	0.28	0.02	0.38	0.02	0.48	0.02
	0.75	0.00	0.02	0.10	0.02	0.20	0.02	0.30	0.02	0.40	0.02	0.50	0.01
0.3	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.10	0.02	0.20	0.02	0.30	0.02	0.40	0.01	0.50	0.01
	0.1	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.08	0.12	0.12	0.18	0.16	0.24	0.21	0.29
	0.25	0.00	0.02	0.08	0.03	0.16	0.04	0.24	0.06	0.33	0.07	0.41	0.09
	0.5	0.00	0.02	0.10	0.02	0.19	0.02	0.29	0.02	0.39	0.01	0.49	0.01
	0.75	0.00	0.02	0.10	0.02	0.20	0.01	0.30	0.01	0.40	0.01	0.50	0.01
0.85	0.00	0.02	0.10	0.02	0.20	0.02	0.30	0.01	0.40	0.01	0.50	0.01	

Notes:

1. Size refers to the proportion of listed firms in the total population of firms; Density refers to the the proportion of listed links to the total number of links in the population.
2. 'Mean' measures the average value of the parameter estimate; RMSE is the Root Mean Squared Error

Table 15: Monte Carlo Results: Experiment 2

Size	Density	Homophily	RMSE	RMSE	RMSE	RMSE	RMSE	RMSE
			$\beta = 0$	$\beta = 0.1$	$\beta = 0.2$	$\beta = 0.3$	$\beta = 0.4$	$\beta = 0.5$
0.1	0.03	0.1	0.02	0.08	0.16	0.24	0.32	0.40
		0.3	0.02	0.05	0.10	0.15	0.20	0.25
		0.5	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.13
		0.75	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02
	0.05	0.1	0.02	0.07	0.13	0.18	0.24	0.29
		0.3	0.02	0.06	0.10	0.15	0.21	0.25
		0.5	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.10
		0.75	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.08
	0.1	0.1	0.03	0.06	0.10	0.15	0.19	0.23
		0.3	0.03	0.05	0.09	0.13	0.18	0.21
		0.5	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.12	0.16	0.20
		0.75	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02
0.2	0.03	0.1	0.01	0.07	0.14	0.21	0.28	0.35
		0.3	0.01	0.04	0.09	0.13	0.17	0.22
		0.5	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.08	0.10
		0.75	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.04
	0.05	0.1	0.01	0.07	0.14	0.21	0.28	0.35
		0.3	0.01	0.04	0.08	0.12	0.16	0.20
		0.5	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.13
		0.75	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.05
	0.1	0.1	0.02	0.06	0.12	0.17	0.22	0.26
		0.3	0.01	0.04	0.08	0.11	0.14	0.18
		0.5	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.08
		0.75	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04

Notes:

1. Size refers to the proportion of listed firms in the total population of firms; Density refers to the the proportion of listed links to the total number of links in the population; Homophily measures the distribution of links that listed companies have between listed links (intra-group links) and mixed links (inter-group links)
2. 'Mean' measures the average value of the parameter estimate; RMSE is the Root Mean Squared Error